Corporate strategy financialized: Conjuncture,arbitrage and earnings capacity in the S&P500

The conjuncture that ushered in the era of shareholder value served to embed capital market expectations into corporate governance aligning management and shareholder interests. Market arbitrage focussed on modifying contractual relations with stakeholders to extract a (higher) return on invested capital. In this article we focus on cash earnings on capital employed generated by the S&P 500 survivor group of firms covering the period 1990–2008. We use this financial data to construct three complementary perspectives on corporate financial performance: firm, firm-relative and macro. Within this framework the financial numbers and perspectives are analogous to a ‘hall of mirrors’ where ambiguity and contradiction are in play frustrating straightforward performative narratives that connect purpose with financial transformation an era of shareholder value.     

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

When it comes to the crunch: What are the drivers of the US banking crisis?

This article considers how permissive regulatory conditions helped change the size and scope of the US mortgage market. Asset backed securitization facilitated an expansion of the US mortgage market and modified the structure of the value chain within which financial assets, risk and liquidity were managed. New sophisticated mortgage products, indulgent lending practices, loose credit assessment and flimsy documentation increased the probability of mortgage default in an economic downturn. US banks were not in a position to absorb mark-to-market losses on mortgage assets and goodwill impairment resulting from a credit crunch because they operate with narrow profit margins and a limited equity cushion in the balance sheet. This article questions the viability and sustainability of this banking business model.     

Food choice models and their relation with food preferences and eating frequency in the Polish population: POFPRES study

A sample of 9339 subjects aged 13–75, living in the six macro-regions of Poland rated the preferences of 140 various food products, eating frequency and factors influencing food choice. Four groups of consumers were found: “consumers susceptible to advertising and seeking novel healthy products” (33.2% of the sample), “consumers not taking care of their health” (25.4%), “consumers not susceptible to advertising and taking care of their health” (32.5%), and “consumers insensitive to sensory attributes of fruit and vegetables” (9.0%). Among factors influencing the food choice, sensory and functional factors were significant, and health and price – moderate. Advertising was generally denied as an important factor in food choice. The food choice motives were highly dependent on age and gender, and to a lower extent – on region of residence, size of place of residence, economic condition and education level. Women/girls more often showed pro-health behaviours in food choice, choice motives, preferences and food intake.     

Doing Unto Others: The Reciprocity of Helping Behavior in Organizations

Reciprocity is a fundamental aspect of social life, and a phenomenon studied from a wide variety of philosophical, theological, and social scientific perspectives. In this study, we use social exchange theory to investigate why employees help other employees. We hypothesize, based on the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), that a significant cause of an employee's helping behavior is how much organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) the employee has received from coworkers. To provide evidence of the discriminant validity of OCB received as an antecedent of helping behavior, we also assess its effects on another form of extra-role behavior, voice, as well as in-role performance. We found, in a sample of 157 employee-supervisor dyads, that OCB received was related to helping behavior after controlling for several antecedents of helping behavior identified in past research, and was less related to voice and in-role behavior, as hypothesized. Implications for theory and practice are presented.     

Exchange rates dynamics revisited: a panel data test of the fractional integration order

We test the possibility that exchange rates from nine developed countries have a unit root against the alternate possibility that they are fractionally integrated. Theoretically, exchange rates are only expected to follow a random walk under restrictive assumptions. However, most traditional unit root tests cannot reject a unit root in exchange rates, and time series tests that allow for fractional integration have given inconclusive results. To increase the power of the test of the integration order we develop two panel data tests of the fractional integration order. Monte Carlo simulations show that these tests are correctly sized and have relatively high power compared to other similar tests. Moreover, our empirical results show that we can reject a unit root in exchange rates with a high probability, but the integration order is close to one. This indicates that exchange rates are mean-reverting, although the reversion is slow, resulting in long swings.     

Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations

We examine the effect of large shareholders? ex ante selling incentives on firms? voluntary disclosure choices in the setting of IPO lockup expirations. We find evidence that managers delay disclosures of bad news, not for their own benefit, but to enable influential pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. Delays are more pronounced when aggregate selling incentives are greater, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists, influential investors with strong selling incentives, own more shares. Simultaneously, managers? disclosure decisions reflect litigation concerns; no significant delays occur when litigation risk is high or when managers trade themselves.