New small firm survival in England

This paper investigates the determinants of the survival, between 2001 and 2004, of 622 small firms in England. Seventy one percent of these firms were less than 5 years old in 2001. Prior work by industrial economists has primarily focussed upon factors such as profitability and exit barriers. In contrast, this paper adopts a more managerial approach by examining whether the human capital of the business owner and organisational variables explain survival and non-survival. Our results suggest the founder’s education and bank finance promote firm survival. Firms which compete on price, or report being financially constrained at start-up, are much less likely to survive.

GLS detrending-based unit root tests in nonlinear STAR and SETAR models

We extend GLS detrending procedure to testing for unit roots against STAR and SETAR alternatives. Monte Carlo simulations and applications to DM/Yen real exchange rates demonstrate that GLS detrending-based nonlinear unit root tests are more powerful than OLS detrending-based counterparts.     

The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures

Many states in the US have in recent years changed the mix ofstate and local revenue sources used to finance local publicexpenditures, especially primary and secondary education, withlocal property taxes being replaced by various sources of statetax revenue. This article examines the desirability of sucha tax substitution, focusing on the implications of the long-standingdebate between the "benefit tax" and "capital tax" views ofthe incidence of the tax. It also includes a discussion of somerecent research that elaborates the capital tax view of theproperty tax. (JEL codes: H10, H21, H22, H71)     

Discovering your authentic leadership

The ongoing problems in business leadership over the past five years have underscored the need for a new kind of leader in the twenty-first century: the authentic leader. Author Bill George, a Harvard Business School professor and the former chairman and CEO of Medtronic, and his colleagues, conducted the largest leadership development study ever undertaken. They interviewed 125 business leaders from different racial, religious, national, and socioeconomic backgrounds to understand how leaders become and remain authentic. Their interviews showed that you do not have to be born with any particular characteristics or traits to lead. You also do not have to be at the top of your organization. Anyone can learn to be an authentic leader. The journey begins with leaders understanding their life stories. Authentic leaders frame their stories in ways that allow them to see themselves not as passive observers but as individuals who learn from their experiences. These leaders make time to examine their experiences and to reflect on them, and in doing so they grow as individuals and as leaders. Authentic leaders also work hard at developing self-awareness through persistent and often courageous self-exploration. Denial can be the greatest hurdle that leaders face in becoming self-aware, but authentic leaders ask for, and listen to, honest feedback. They also use formal and informal support networks to help them stay grounded and lead integrated lives. The authors argue that achieving business results over a sustained period of time is the ultimate mark of authentic leadership. It may be possible to drive short-term outcomes without being authentic, but authentic leadership is the only way to create long-term results.     

Crisis at the summit

An unrecognized affliction is striking certain gifted performers at the top of their game. Its cause, paradoxically, is success itself. These stars, who thrive on conquering new challenges, can lose their bearings and question their purpose once a job has been mastered. A vague dissatisfaction gives way to confusion and then to inner turmoil. Left unattended, this summit syndrome can derail promising careers. The syndrome has three phases. In the approach phase, when most of the challenges of a current job have been met, sufferers tend to push harder in a vain attempt to recapture the adrenaline rush of the climb. Then, in the plateauing phase, when virtually all the challenges have been conquered, these individuals, who are incapable of coasting, bear down to try to produce ever more stellar results, but to less effect and greater dissatisfaction. This leads to the terminal descending phase, when performance slips noticeably. As their superstar status fades, they jump ship, accept demotions, or take lateral transfers. It's a terrible waste, for if the syndrome is recognized, steps can be taken before performance slips to dispel the confusion and set the stage for productive growth to the next assignment. There are four parts to this process: First, understand your "winning formula"--the characteristic way you approach a situation--and the vital part it plays in feeling stale or losing your edge. Second, reconnect with your core purpose in life. Third, recast your current, or future, job to better align your inner aspirations with the external requirements of your work. And fourth, create a developmental path by honing a handful of core leadership competencies. None of this is easy, but for talented individuals--and the organizations that rely on them--the vaccine of preventive awareness is far better than gambling on an after-the-fact cure once the crisis is full-blown.     

Is it real? Can we win? Is it worth doing? Managing risk and reward in an innovation portfolio

Minor innovations make up most of a company's development portfolio, on average, but they never generate the growth companies seek. The solution, says Day--the Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor of Marketing and a codirector of the Mack Center for Technological Innovation at Wharton--is for companies to undertake a systematic, disciplined review of their innovation portfolios and increase the number of major innovations at an acceptable level of risk. Two tools can help them do this. The first, called the risk matrix, graphically reveals the distribution of risk across a company's entire innovation portfolio. The matrix allows companies to estimate each project's probability of success or failure, based on how big a stretch it is for the firm to undertake. The less familiar the product or technology and the intended market, the higher the risk. The second tool, dubbed the R-W-W (real-win-worth it) screen, allows companies to evaluate the risks and potential of individual projects by answering six fundamental questions about each one: Is the market real? Explores customers' needs, their willingness to buy, and the size of the potential market. Is the product real? Looks at the feasibility of producing the innovation. Can the product be competitive? and Can our company be competitive? Investigate how well suited the company's resources and management are to compete in the marketplace with the product. Will the product be profitable at an acceptable risk? Explores the financial analysis needed to assess an innovation's commercial viability. Last, Does launching the product make strategic sense? examines the project's fit with company strategy and whether management supports it.     

Managing global accounts

Global account management--which treats a multinational customer's operations as one integrated account, with coherent terms for pricing, product specifications, and service--has proliferated over the past decade. Yet according to the authors' research, only about a third of the suppliers that have offered GAM are pleased with the results. The unhappy majority may be suffering from confusion about when, how, and to whom to provide it. Yip, the director of research and innovation at Capgemini, and Bink, the head of marketing communications at Uxbridge College, have found that GAM can improve customer satisfaction by 20% or more and can raise both profits and revenues by at least 15% within just a few years of its introduction. They provide guidelines to help companies achieve similar results. The first steps are determining whether your products or services are appropriate for GAM, whether your customers want such a program, whether those customers are crucial to your strategy, and how GAM might affect your competitive advantage. If moving forward makes sense, the authors' exhibit, "A Scorecard for Selecting Global Accounts," can help you target the right customers. The final step is deciding which of three basic forms to offer: coordination GAM (in which national operations remain relatively strong), control GAM (in which the global operation and the national operations are fairly balanced), and separate GAM (in which a new business unit has total responsibility for global accounts). Given the difficulty and expense of providing multiple varieties, the vast majority of companies should initially customize just one---and they should be careful not to start with a choice that is too ambitious for either themselves or their customers to handle.     

The (S,s) Policy is an Optimal Trading Strategy in a Class of Commodity Price Speculation Problems

This paper introduces a model of commodity price speculation and proves that the optimal trading strategy is of the (S,s) form when a no expected loss condition holds. A strong form of this condition is that the retail price charged to consumers at time t exceeds the expected wholesale price of the commodity at time t+1, i.e. , where β ∈(0,1) is the speculator’s discount factor. We are extremely grateful to Herbert Scarf for pointing out an important error in a previous draft of this paper and for suggesting the key argument in a revised proof that fixed the problem. We also benefited from helpful feedback from an anonymous referee, William Brainard, Zvi Eckstein, participants of seminars at Yale, the Operations Research Center at MIT, and the Econometric Society Winter School at the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.     

The Effects of Biasing Performance Measurement Systems on Incentives and Retention Decisions

We examine a principal–agent setting in which the principal uses a performance measurement system for multiple purposes—to provide incentives and for retention decisions. The principal chooses the nature and extent of bias in the system, which determines whether the performance report is stringent, neutral, or lenient relative to the unobservable actual outcome. We show that when the report is used only for incentive purposes (an incentive role), stringency alleviates moral hazard. On the other hand, when the principal's objective is to minimize the cost from incorrect retention and firing decisions (a fit evaluation role), there is a demand for leniency. Surprisingly, however, we show that adding a fit evaluation role to a system serving an incentive role can accentuate the demand for stringency because stronger incentives can also indirectly improve retention decisions.