Present at the Beginning of a New Era for Antitrust: Reflections on 1982–1983

The early 1980s were an important time of transitionfor antitrust policy for the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice. I had the privilege to beselected to serve as the first ``Chief Economist' forthe newly installed Assistant Attorney General forAntitrust, William F. Baxter. In this essay I discusssome of the important achievements of that period, aswell as some missed opportunities.     

Institutional contradiction and management control innovation: A field study of total quality management practices in a privatized telecommunication company

The purpose of this paper is to theorise the changes surrounding the introduction of a management control innovation, total quality management (TQM) techniques, within Telecom Fiji Limited. Using institutional theory and drawing on empirical evidence from multiple sources including interviews, discussions and documents, the paper explicates the institutionalization of these TQM practices. The focus of the paper is the micro-processes and practice changes around TQM implementation, rather than the influence of the macro-level structures that are often linked with institutional theory. The change agents used Quality Action Teams and the National Quality Council to introduce new TQM routines. The present study extends the scope of institutional analysis by explaining how institutional contradictions impact to create and make space for institutional entrepreneurs, who in turn, modify existing routines or introduce new routines in fluid organizational environments which also exhibit evidence of resistance.     

Keeping up with the Joneses? Evidence from Peer Performance in the Banking Industry

This paper traces the reaction of US banks to ROE underperformance on liquidity creation, equity capital, and loan loss provisions. We find that banks change their structures in the subsequent quarter after underperformance by increasing their on-balance and off-balance sheet liquidity creation to increase profitability. Banks tend to increase their equity capital and improve their loan quality by lowering non-discretionary loan loss provisions to become safer. Banks signal their ability to overcome underperformance by increasing their discretionary loan loss provisions. Our results reveal that large banks rely mainly on off-balance sheet liquidity creation as their primary tool to recover from underperformance while medium-size and small banks adjust their equity capital to increase their safety.     

Signaling effects of recurrent list-price reductions on the likelihood of house sales

Recurrent list-price reductions for a house may signal the impatience of sellers to conclude a sell transaction more quickly, leading to more visits and a higher likelihood of being sold (positive signal). Recurrent list-price reductions may also provide a market signal that the listing is problematic and thus harder to sell without a list-price reduction, leading to a lower likelihood of being sold (negative signal). Unlike standard survival analysis, we investigate which signal prevails using a joint frailty model that accounts for the interdependence among recurrent list-price reductions and the association between the recurrent reductions and the sold event. Our novel data set contains the time-dated recurrent list-price reductions for each house listed on the market. The results from the joint frailty model show time-varying negative impacts of list-price reductions on the likelihood of a house sale, supporting the dominance of the negative signaling effects of recurrent list-price reductions. Although listings with frequent list-price reductions are less likely to be sold, sold houses sell at a higher ratio of sold price to last list price, which incorporates current market conditions and fairer pricing, holding constant the initial list price and the aggregate list-price reduction from the initial list price.     

Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage

This article investigates the incentives of agents working with buyers (buying agents) under the fixed percentage commission system and the implications on housing market outcomes. Our model shows that the absence of a binding contract creates a risk of losing clients for buying agents, which helps mitigate the conflict of interest between buying agents and their clients. Both the buying agent's prediction accuracy regarding their client's reservation prices and the level of tolerance given by the buyer to the buying agent affect the binding force. Results from simulations and empirical analyses using house transactions in Canada support our model predictions.