Moral Hazard and Reciprocity

We investigate the motives behind reciprocal behavior by making selfish acts anonymous and not common knowledge. In one treatment, subjects were assigned to the role of proposer or responder and played a trust game with random matching for 20 rounds. In a second treatment, the modified game, the procedures were the same, but responders were allowed to choose with only 80% probability. With 20% probability, responders were restricted to keep any money passed. Only responders knew whether they were restricted or not. We find that the behavior of responders is different in this modified trust game. The fact that responders can hide selfish acts generates more selfish behavior. This in turn makes proposers less likely to pass money to responders, thereby destroying trust. We find important session effects in the standard trust game but less so in the modified game. Our experiments show that information conveyed in actions is important to subjects' decisions.     

Governing farmland conversion: Comparing China with the Netherlands and Germany

Farmland conversion has become an increasing concern in China and other parts of the world, including Europe and the USA. Be it for environmental or food security reasons, questions arise concerning how urbanization should be governed, i.e. what rules and regulations could enhance the efficiency and sustainability of land use. Taking a first step toward answering such questions, this paper describes different governance structures for farmland conversion in the Netherlands, Germany, and China. Secondly, it compares five identified differences between these countries in the realms of land property, land use planning, the role of the market, the role of government, and the performance of governance structures. The purpose of this paper is to develop an approach for comparing governance structures for land conversion that: (a) offers some opportunities for exchange of experience between the three countries and (b) provides a framework for further research on governance structures in farmland conversion.     

A Hierarchy-of-Effects Approach to Designing a Social Marketing Game

While there is great enthusiasm and interest by social marketers for games as a social marketing intervention, there is little evidence of the impact of these games. This research seeks to fill this gap by testing a theoretical model based on the experiential hierarchy of effects. An online game about the physiological effects of drinking was designed for high-school students and implemented in an educational curriculum with 223 participants (96% response rate) completing an online survey. The data was analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) and showed support for nine of the eleven hypotheses. The results show game characteristics of enjoyment (feel), knowledge (learn), and challenge (do) significantly related to attitudes and moderate-drinking behavioral intentions, ability to control drinking, and awareness of the physical consequences of drinking. There were no gender differences.     

Exploring the determinants of E-loyalty among travel agencies

This study aims to explore and empirically build up an e-loyalty model for the burgeoning e-service of Taiwan's travel agencies. Mailed data and data collected in personal from multiple sources is used for helping to identify the determinants of e-loyalty between Taiwan's wholesaler and retailer travel agencies. Several statistical techniques, including confirmatory factor analysis, correlation analysis, and a linear structural relationship (LISREL) are used, and a structural equation is implemented to test the e-loyalty model. The results indicate that Taiwan's wholesaler travel agencies might consider e-quality as well as trust as the most important antecedents to e-loyalty, whereas loyalty results in the increased transaction intentions of retailers. No related studies so far have analysed or tried to discern the cause-and-effect relationship between e-loyalty and transaction intention for travel agencies. This paper also proposes an optimal e-loyalty model that matches the essential development needs of B2B commerce transaction. Finally, the model herein illustrates how wholesalers can realise e-commerce strategic goals by acquiring the e-loyalty of retailer travel agencies.     

Pricing of card payment services in Scandinavian banking: a comment

Willesson [(2009). Pricing of card payment services in Scandinavian banking. The Service Industries Journal, 29(3), 387–399] purports to demonstrate that when it comes to pricing of card payment services, Scandinavian banks with foreign operations will typically align themselves with the ‘pricing tradition’ in their foreign market(s). Unfortunately, a problem with Willesson's approach is that for several banks in his sample the foreign pricing tradition happens to coincide with the pricing strategy that the bank uses in its home market. As a result, it is impossible to determine whether these banks have really opted for a strategy of national responsiveness.     

INTERNATIONAL RELOCATION OF PRODUCTION: WHERE DO FIRMS GO?

The flexible relocation of capacity across countries by multinational enterprises has become an important source of concern. Using a unique sample of relocating firms in Belgium, we find that wages and market potential of host regions are important determinants for the location choice. Considering firm characteristics, we show that large firms have a higher propensity to relocate to remote countries. Public aid only plays a decisive role in the investment decision for relocations to adjacent countries, suggesting a potential harmful role in distorting competition. More proactive policies in line with changing comparative location advantages should be implemented to accommodate relocations.     

Regulating Multiple Polluters: Deterrence and Liability Allocation

We consider regulation of multiple polluters when individual emissions are unobservable. The tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, we compare an industry consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. Contrary to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators.     

Are options redundant? Further evidence from currency futures markets

This paper investigates the impact of the introduction of options on the underlying asset's price formation process, using Geweke feedback measures. We derive the feedback measures from the Deutsche Mark, British Pound, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen and Canadian Dollar futures and spot prices, before and after the introduction of options for these currency futures. While each currency market maintains some distinct characteristics in the post-option period, a common theme is found: after the option introduction, the instantaneous feedback between spot and futures markets improves drastically. The feedback from the spot to the futures market tends to decrease and remains small. The feedback from the futures market to the spot market tends to decrease as well. These results confirm the dominance of options markets, probably due to their smaller transaction costs. When made available, options assume a leading role for information transmission in currency markets.     

U.S. and Canadian Industrial Relations: Convergent or Divergent?

Two models, the divergence and the convergence models, address comparisons of Canadian and American industrial relations. Most specialists support the divergence hypothesis. It asserts that the two countries' systems have produced major transnational differences in industrial relations outputs. The convergence model reassessed the assumptions, data, and conclusions of the divergent model and concluded that the two countries' systems produced very similar, although not identical, industrial relations outputs.