全文获取类型
收费全文 | 3486篇 |
免费 | 212篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 431篇 |
工业经济 | 115篇 |
计划管理 | 758篇 |
经济学 | 1149篇 |
综合类 | 11篇 |
运输经济 | 95篇 |
旅游经济 | 84篇 |
贸易经济 | 782篇 |
农业经济 | 117篇 |
经济概况 | 154篇 |
邮电经济 | 2篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 62篇 |
2022年 | 49篇 |
2021年 | 64篇 |
2020年 | 126篇 |
2019年 | 153篇 |
2018年 | 251篇 |
2017年 | 309篇 |
2016年 | 221篇 |
2015年 | 124篇 |
2014年 | 170篇 |
2013年 | 673篇 |
2012年 | 197篇 |
2011年 | 184篇 |
2010年 | 186篇 |
2009年 | 120篇 |
2008年 | 127篇 |
2007年 | 99篇 |
2006年 | 91篇 |
2005年 | 85篇 |
2004年 | 60篇 |
2003年 | 46篇 |
2002年 | 56篇 |
2001年 | 34篇 |
2000年 | 31篇 |
1999年 | 23篇 |
1998年 | 23篇 |
1997年 | 16篇 |
1996年 | 11篇 |
1995年 | 10篇 |
1994年 | 4篇 |
1993年 | 11篇 |
1992年 | 5篇 |
1991年 | 12篇 |
1990年 | 4篇 |
1989年 | 3篇 |
1988年 | 3篇 |
1987年 | 3篇 |
1986年 | 4篇 |
1985年 | 6篇 |
1984年 | 3篇 |
1983年 | 6篇 |
1981年 | 3篇 |
1979年 | 2篇 |
1978年 | 3篇 |
1977年 | 3篇 |
1976年 | 3篇 |
1974年 | 3篇 |
1972年 | 2篇 |
1970年 | 2篇 |
1964年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有3698条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
41.
This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies. 相似文献
42.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
43.
A new framework is presented for the study of the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Koopmans’ equation in the unbounded
case, that is based on the contraction mapping approach. In the bounded below case with bounded consumption streams, uniqueness
of the solution in the whole class of weak-star continuous utility functions is obtained. When the aggregator is unbounded
below and/or consumption streams are unbounded, existence of a weak-star continuous solution is shown, and a simple criterium
to check the sufficient conditions for existence is provided.
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero and Carlos Rodríguez-Palmero gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER funds under Research Projects MTM2005-06534 and SEJ2005-08709/ECON, respectively, and by Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Castilla y León under Research Projects VA99/04 and VA017B05, respectively. This paper has substantially benefited from the comments of an
anonymous referee. Particular and special thanks are due to Robert Becker for his very helpful comments and valuable suggestions. 相似文献
44.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
45.
Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at
-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most
percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a
-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if
where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that
-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller
s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D21, D52, D71, G39.
Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés. 相似文献
46.
Tamás Rudas 《Quality and Quantity》1991,25(4):345-358
The present paper considers some new models for the analysis of multidimensional contigency tables. Although the theoretical background used here appeared already in Haberman (1974), prescribed conditional interaction (PCIN) models were introduced by Rudas (1987) and their mathematical properties were worked out by Leimer and Rudas (1988). These models are defined by prescribing the values of certain conditional interactions in the contingency table. Conditional interaction is defined here as the logarithm of an appropriately defined conditional odds ratio. This conditional odds ratio is a conditional version of a generalization of the well known odds ratio of a 2×2 table and that of the three factor interaction term of a 2×2×2 table and applies to any number of dimensions and any number of categories of the variables. The well known log-linear (LL) models are special PCIN models. Estimated frequencies under PCIN models and tests of fit can be computed using existing statistical software (e.g. BMDP). The paper describes the class of PCIN models and compares it to the class of association models of Goodman (1981). As LL models are widely used in the analysis of social mobility tables, application of more general PCIN models is illustrated. 相似文献
47.
48.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Spanish Economic Review》2006,8(4):271-283
We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions 相似文献
49.
Certain manuals and computer programs mistakenly identify the mean with the constant in Box-Jenkins time series models. In this paper, it will be shown that (a) the mean and the constant have different values in autoregressive models, and (b) they have an algebraic and graphical relationship. 相似文献
50.
We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive. 相似文献