When marketing and innovation interact: The case of born-global firms

Previous research on born-global firms (BGs) has emphasized their strong dependency on establishing a competitive positioning from the early days of their existence. While many researchers emphasized BGs’ innovativeness as a driver of their competitiveness, the capabilities underlying BGs’ innovativeness are still under-researched, specifically, marketing, and innovation-related capabilities. Based on a preliminary stage of in-depth interviews with senior managers, we identified three capabilities, market intelligence generation, marketing adaptability, and team cohesion, that underscore the interaction between innovation and marketing. We then performed a SEM analysis based on data collected from 127 BGs. Our findings indicate that marketing intelligence and team cohesion directly and positively impact BGs’ innovativeness. Marketing adaptability was found to be moderated by environmental conditions—economic development and technological development. When economic development is high, salesforce adaptability enhances BGs’ innovativeness, while product adaptability or communication adaptability decreases BGs’ innovativeness. When technological development is high, product adaptability enhances BGs’ innovativeness, while salesforce adaptability decreases BGs’ innovativeness.     

Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles

In many economic settings, like spectrum and real-estate auctions, geometric figures on the plane are for sale. Each bidder bids for his desired figure, and the auctioneer has to choose a set of disjoint figures that maximizes the social welfare. In this work, we design mechanisms that are both incentive compatible and computationally feasible for these environments. Since the underlying algorithmic problem is computationally hard, these mechanisms cannot always achieve the optimal welfare; Nevertheless, they do guarantee a fraction of the optimal solution. We differentiate between two information models—when both the desired figures and their values are unknown to the auctioneer or when only the agents' values are private data. We guarantee different fractions of the optimal welfare for each information model and for different families of figures (e.g., arbitrary convex figures or axis-aligned rectangles). We suggest using a measure on the geometric diversity of the figures for expressing the quality of the approximations that our mechanisms provide.     

WHAT IS “INSURANCE”? LESSONS FROM THE CAPTIVE INSURANCE TAX CONTROVERSY

Abstract: Over the past 30 years, the tax treatment of insurance premiums paid to captive (i.e., subsidiary) insurance companies has generated considerable controversy and litigation. In this article, we propose a new definition of insurance that is motivated by a careful analysis of the issues raised in the captive insurance tax controversy. Emphasizing the fundamental roles played by market forces and the efficiency of risk transfers, this new definition both broadens and refines traditional definitions of insurance.     

Portfolio Choice and Life Insurance: The CRRA Case

We solve a portfolio choice problem that includes life insurance and labor income under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. We focus on the correlation between the dynamics of human capital and financial capital and model the utility of the family as opposed to separating consumption and bequest. We simplify the underlying Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation using a similarity reduction technique that leads to an efficient numerical solution. Households for whom shocks to human capital are negatively correlated with shocks to financial capital should own more life insurance with greater equity/stock exposure. Life insurance hedges human capital and is insensitive to the family's risk aversion, consistent with practitioner guidance.     

The Implied Longevity Yield: A Note on Developing an Index for Life Annuities

I develop an index for tracking the dynamic behavior of life (pension) annuity payouts over time, based on the concept of self‐annuitization. Our implied longevity yield (ILY) value is defined equal to the internal rate of return (IRR) over a fixed deferral period that an individual would have to earn on their investable wealth if they decided to self‐annuitize using a systematic withdrawal plan. A larger ILY number indicates a greater relative benefit from immediate annuitization. I use age 65—with a 10‐year period certain—compared against the same annuity at age 75 as the standard benchmark for the index, and calibrate to a comprehensive time series of weekly (Canadian) life annuity quotes from 2000 through 2004. I find that during this period the ILY varied from 5.45 percent to 6.90 percent for males and from 5.00 percent to 6.42 percent for females and was highly correlated with a duration‐weighted average yield of 10‐year and long‐term Government of Canada bonds. I believe our ILY metric can help promote and explain the benefits of acquiring lifetime payout annuities by translating the abstract‐sounding longevity insurance into more concrete and measurable financial rates of return.     

Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.     

Non-price strategic behavior: the case of bank branches

We perform an empirical study of banks’ branching decisions as a strategic non-price variable in an oligopolistic setting. Using panel data of banks from Norway, we find clear evidence that banks act strategically in their branching decisions, taking into consideration the future response from rival banks. The analysis is applied to a unique data set which covers the entire banking sector during both pre- and post-banking crisis periods, where very different types of conduct are found in each of these periods both for banks and borrowers. Moreover, we find that a bank specific branch-network does not confer externality on other banks. As a result branch network affects only market shares but not market size.     

AUDITOR CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND DISPERSION OF INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS

The effect of auditor change announcements on the dispersion of investor expectations is investigated by using two approaches. First, the consensus effect (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1990) is measured by examining unanticipated trading volume change. We show that auditor change announcements provide information to the market, and that the consensus effect dominates the informedness effect. Second, the reduction in information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) due to auditor change announcements is demonstrated by a reduction in proportional bid-ask spread, which is not driven by increased trading volume. Thus, auditor change announcements reduce dispersion of investor beliefs in that they are both information asymmetry-reducing and consensus-increasing. Finally, we show that the type of auditor change (Big-Eight to Non-Big-Eight, Non-Big-Eight to Big-Eight, or Within-Class) has no impact on the dispersion-reducing effect of auditor change announcements.