Bayesian Variable Selection in Spatial Autoregressive Models

This paper compares the performance of Bayesian variable selection approaches for spatial autoregressive models. It presents two alternative approaches that can be implemented using Gibbs sampling methods in a straightforward way and which allow one to deal with the problem of model uncertainty in spatial autoregressive models in a flexible and computationally efficient way. A simulation study shows that the variable selection approaches tend to outperform existing Bayesian model averaging techniques in terms of both in-sample predictive performance and computational efficiency. The alternative approaches are compared in an empirical application using data on economic growth for European NUTS-2 regions.     

Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?

This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the rate of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.     

Inefficient entry order in preemption games

In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This provides a microfoundation to the assumption that entry in a market occurs in the order of profitability, commonly used in the empirical analysis of market entry. We provide a counterexample showing that with more than two players this intuitive result can be reversed. We present a preemption game of entry into a new market. The potential entrants are three asymmetric firms: one “efficient” firm with high post-entry profits, and two “inefficient firms”. We show that the set of parameters such that the equilibrium entry order does not reflect the efficiency ranking is nonempty, and analyse which changes in post-entry profits preserve this entry order.     

Necessity and Opportunity Entrepreneurs and Their Duration in Self-employment: Evidence from German Micro Data

Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), we analyze whether necessity entrepreneurs differ from opportunity entrepreneurs in terms of self-employment duration. Using univariate statistics, we find that opportunity entrepreneurs remain in self-employment longer than necessity entrepreneurs. However, after controlling for the entrepreneurs’ education in the professional area where they start their venture, this effect is no longer significant. We therefore conclude that the difference observed is not an original effect but rather is due to selection. We then go on to discuss the implications of our findings for entrepreneurship-policy making, and give suggestions to improve governmental start-up programs.

Entrepreneurial orientation in long-lived family firms

We apply a key construct from the entrepreneurship field, entrepreneurial orientation (EO), in the context of long-lived family firms. Our qualitative in-depth case studies show that a permanently high level of the five EO dimensions is not a necessary condition for long-term success, as traditional entrepreneurship and EO literature implicitly suggest. Rather, we claim that the level of EO is dynamically adapted over time and that the original EO scales (autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness) do not sufficiently capture the full extent of entrepreneurial behaviors in long-lived family firms. Based on these considerations we suggest extending the existing EO scales to provide a more fine-grained depiction of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms.     

The Continuing Continuum Problem of Deposits and Loans

Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 18(2):179–194, 2011) argue that one cannot distinguish between deposits and loans due to the continuum problem of maturities and because future goods do not exist—both essential characteristics that distinguish deposit from loan contracts. In a similar way but leading to opposite conclusions (Cachanosky, forthcoming) maintains that both maturity mismatching and fractional reserve banking are ethically justified as these contracts are equivalent. We argue herein that the economic and legal differences between genuine deposit and loan contracts are clear. This implies different legal obligations for these contracts, a necessary step in assessing the ethics of both fractional reserve banking and maturity mismatching. While the former is economically, legally, and perhaps most importantly ethically problematic, there are no such troubles with the latter.     

Welfare‐ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition

Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12