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Jared?Rubin Anya?Samek Roman?M.?SheremetaEmail authorView authors OrcID profile 《Experimental Economics》2018,21(2):292-315
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from quality to quantity to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform managers of appropriate ways to structure contracts, and suggest benefits to personalizing contracts based on individual behavioral characteristics. 相似文献
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L. Alan Winters Terrie L. Walmsley Zhen Kun Wang Roman Grynberg 《The World Economy》2003,26(8):1137-1161
We discuss liberalising the temporary mobility of workers under Mode 4 of the GATS, particularly the movement of medium and low skilled service providers between developing and developed countries. Such mobility potentially offers huge returns: a flow equivalent to three per cent of developed countries’ skilled and unskilled work forces would generate an estimated increase in world welfare of over US$150 billion, shared fairly equally between developing and developed countries. The larger part of this emanates from the less‐skilled, essentially because losing higher‐skilled workers cuts output in developing countries severely. The mass migration of less skilled workers raises fears in developed countries for cultural identity, problems of assimilation and the drain on the public purse. These fears are hardly relevant to temporary movement, however. The biggest economic concern from temporary mobility is its competitive challenge to local less skilled workers. But as populations age and the average levels of training and education rise, developed countries will face an increasing scarcity of less skilled labour. Temporary mobility thus actually offers a strong communality of interest between developing and developed countries. The remainder of the paper looks at the GATS provisions on Mode 4 and the commitments that have been made under it. The paper reviews several official proposals for the Doha talks, including the very detailed one from India, and considers several countries’ existing schemes for the temporary movement of foreign workers. Many countries have long had bilateral foreign worker programmes, and some regional agreements provide for liberal and flexible movement. These show what is feasible and how concerns can be overcome. We caution that, to be useful, any WTO agreement must increase mobility, not just bureaucratise it. The paper concludes with some modest and practical proposals. We suggest, inter alia, that licensing firms to arrange the movement of labour is the most promising short‐term approach to increasing temporary mobility. 相似文献
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Frequent price promotions force consumers to continuously reassess their preferences over product offerings. When this leads consumers to exhibit a bias of “relative thinking”, such as may be triggered by a focus only on the most salient product attribute, we show in a model of sales (Varian, H. R., 1980, American Economic Review, 70(4), pp. 651–659) that this profoundly alters firms' pricing and product-positioning strategies. Vertical differentiation becomes more likely, with firms preferring to occupy the low-quality space in particular when they have few loyal consumers. More generally, product positioning now depends on the composition of consumers' consideration sets. 相似文献
266.
In a variety of purchasing situations, consumers may focus primarily on headline prices, disregarding the full costs associated with acquiring and maintaining a product or service contract. Even when this is the case, the literature has delineated various circumstances where intense competition can protect consumers through the so-called “waterbed effect.” In this article, we however show that when consumers have context-dependent preferences, competition may rather exacerbate their and society's harm by distorting product choice and provision. Then, consumer protection policy must sufficiently constrain hidden fees so that competition, along with high-quality firms' incentives to educate consumers, can restore efficiency. 相似文献