Contracts offered by bureaucrats

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low‐powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low‐powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.     

Does the famine experience of board chair hamper innovation?

This study examines whether and how the famine experiences of board chairs influence the innovation of their firms. Results using a sample comprising 8882 firm-year observations from Chinese firms during the period 2003 to 2017 reveal that the board chair's famine experience has a negative effect on innovation. This negative effect is strengthened by famine intensity and high uncertainty. The obtained results are robust to alternative measures, endogeneity issues, omitted variables, and sample selection bias. Additional analyses showed that the relationship between board chair's famine experience and innovation is mediated by cash holdings and R&D investment. The overall results contribute to imprinting theory by explaining that early-life famine experiences of board chairs create survival threat imprints among them, eventually affecting their later-life behaviors. The findings also provide implications by highlighting how the early-life traumatic experiences of executives adversely influence their firms outcomes.     

Board social capital and stock price crash risk

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We show how board social capital influences stock price crash risk. Considering that directors are embedded in two kinds of social...