Neue Weltklimaordnung: Emissionshandel zwischen Staaten mit schrittweiser Klimagerechtigkeit

Der Diskussionsprozess um ein internationales Klimaabkommen und zur Klimagerechtigkeit dauert an. Die Autoren stellen ein Modell vor, das Klimagerechtigkeit schrittweise und mit marktbasierten Instrumenten umsetzt. Sie fordern eine internationale Weltklimaordnung, die auf der Weltklimakonferenz in Südafrika im Dezember 2011 umgesetzt werden soll.     

Communication in intergroup conflicts

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies rent-seeking for pure public goods. We observe the effect of different communication structures in the context of a finitely repeated intergroup contest and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if communication is restricted to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. However, expenditures are significantly lower if open communication within one's own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open communication intergroup conflicts are avoided by groups taking turns in winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communication for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate the destructive nature of intergroup conflict and group rent-seeking.     

Rückkaufswert von Lebensversicherungen und Europarecht

This article deals with the calculation of surrender values of life assurances according to §169 Abs. 3 VVG and its conformity with European Law. The main focus is on the influence of this regulation on designing and offering assurance products by insurers of other Member States of the European Union under the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services. The problems with guaranteed surrender values and distribution of acquisition costs have, therefore, to be examined. Finally, the European principle that consumer information prevails over regulation of product design has to be discussed against the background of the European internal market.     

Innovator networks and regional knowledge base

Although network analysis has gained increasing attention over the last years, the literature on Regional Innovation Systems thus far has not embraced network methods. This study is an attempt to enrich the Regional Innovation System concept by applying social network methods to quantitatively assess the extent to which innovating actors in a region engage in systemic forms of knowledge exchange and collaboration. On the basis of a comparison of three rather different regional innovator networks, the paper suggests that regions with a strong knowledge base that are specialized in broad technology fields tend to have relatively fragmented network structures.     

Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains

The design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players' expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling (1960)). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey. JEL classification L22, L42, L81.     

ON CONSUMERS' VALUATION OF NUTRITION INFORMATION

The European Union (EU) is contemplating regulations requiring mandatory provision of nutritional information on food products. This study analyses consumers' valuation of nutritional information using data collected from a field survey. The results generally suggest that consumers value and are willing to pay about 5.9 percent of the original price for nutritional information on the food product we studied. Individuals who are non-price-sensitive, nutritionally knowledgeable and with longer time horizon are willing to pay more for nutritional information than others. Considering consumers' willingness to pay for nutritional information on food products and an EU impact assessment study, the costs of provision of this information are not prohibitive to firms. We estimate that the least conservative cost of labelling to the firm for a specific food product can be as much as €29,431, whereas the average economic value of nutrition information is estimated at €17,064. The firm can therefore recoup the associated costs in less than two months.     

USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*

This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.     

Decentralized learning from failure

We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through Crawford and Haller's [Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination games, Econometrica 58 (1990) 571-595] attainability constraints on strategies. We analyze a repeated game with imperfectly observable actions. A fixed subset of action profiles are successes and all others are failures. The location of successes is unknown. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. We partially characterize optimal attainable strategies in the infinite horizon game by showing that after any fixed time, agents will occasionally randomize while at the same time mixing probabilities cannot be uniformly bounded away from zero.