Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Noisy chaotic dynamics in commodity markets

The nonlinear testing and modeling of economic and financial time series has increased substantially in recent years, enabling us to better understand market and price behavior, risk and the formation of expectations. Such tests have also been applied to commodity market behavior, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity, chaos, long memory, cyclicity, etc. The present evaluation of futures price behavior confirms that the resulting price movements can be random, suggesting noisy chaotic behavior. Prices could thus follow a mean process that is dynamic chaotic, coupled with a variance that follows a GARCH process. Our conclusion is that models of this type could be constructed to assist in forecasting prices in the short run but not over long run time periods.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: March 2003     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Price–Cost Margins and Structural Change: Sub-Contracting within the Salmon Marketing Chain

Some recent studies have benefited from advances in time series econometrics in order to evaluate price transmission mechanisms along the marketing chain. Due to the length of time series, structural changes may affect the evaluation of price–cost margins. In the case of the fresh salmon trade between Norway and France, the gross margin between producers and retailers has changed in level between January 1988 and December 1999. This article accurately identifies the date of a structural change using a range of recent ADF testing procedures (Gregory–Hansen tests, forward and backward recursive tests), before looking for the causes of the change through a survey. Two major factors can be identified: the product form and the marketing channel. Interestingly, both the increasing level of processing and the development of supermarket chains have resulted in a new role for the intermediaries, shifting from mere commercial intermediation to sub‐contracting for the big retailers.     

Optimal growth and cycles in overlapping generations models

Summary This paper investigates the dynamical properties of optimal paths in one-sector overlapping generations models without assuming that the utility function of the representative agent is separable. When the utility function is separable, the optimal growth paths monotonically converges toward the modified golden rule steady state. In the non-separable case, we show that the optimal growth path may be oscillating and optimal two-period cycles may exist. Applying these results to the model with altruism, we show that the condition of operative bequest is fully compatible with endogeneous fluctuations provided that the discount factor is close enough to one. All our results are illustrated using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.We thank C. Blackorby, J. Blot, P. Cartigny and one anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions which generally improved the exposition of the paper. We would also like to thank the participants of the Population and demography session of the European Economic Association 10th Annual Congress (Prague, The Czech Republic, September 1–4, 1995).     

Central bank interventions and jumps in double long memory models of daily exchange rates

In this paper, we estimate ARFIMA–FIGARCH models for the major exchange rates (against the US dollar) which have been subject to direct central bank interventions in the last decades. We show that the normality assumption is not adequate due to the occurrence of volatility outliers and its rejection is related to these interventions. Consequently, we rely on a normal mixture distribution that allows for endogenously determined jumps in the process governing the exchange rate dynamics. This distribution performs rather well and is found to be important for the estimation of the persistence of volatility shocks. Introducing a time-varying jump probability associated to central bank interventions, we find that the central bank interventions, conducted in either a coordinated or unilateral way, induce a jump in the process and tend to increase exchange rate volatility.     

An Empirical Study of Firm Size and Competitiveness in German Life Insurance

Based on a purely rank-oriented approach, this empirical study analyzes to what extent superior firm size in German life industry generally translates into corporate advantages for the companies concerned. It turns out that while modest advantages with some criteria are measurable, any such benefits are usually outweighed by unquantifiable factors unrelated to firm size. Confining the study to a highly homogeneous subgroup of life insurers, however, reveals substantial corporate advantages in a number of areas, thereby confirming well-established theoretical reasoning.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

Limit theorems for reflected Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes

This paper studies one‐dimensional Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) processes, with the distinguishing feature that they are reflected on a single boundary (put at level 0) or two boundaries (put at levels 0 and d > 0). In the literature, they are referred to as reflected OU (ROU) and doubly reflected OU (DROU), respectively. For both cases, we explicitly determine the decay rates of the (transient) probability to reach a given extreme level. The methodology relies on sample‐path large deviations, so that we also identify the associated most likely paths. For DROU, we also consider the ‘idleness process’ L_t and the ‘loss process’ U_t, which are the minimal non‐decreasing processes, which make the OU process remain ≥ 0 and ≤ d, respectively. We derive central limit theorems (CLTs) for U_t and L_t, using techniques from stochastic integration and the martingale CLT.