LA GOUVERNANCE PAR L’EVALUATION. LES QUASI‐MARCHES DANS LES SERVICES A DOMICILE

RESUME 1 : Cet article propose une étude du rôle croissant que joue l’évaluation dans la gouvernance des services à domicile en Europe. L’introduction de quasi‐marchés dans plusieurs pays européens va de pair avec un processus d’autonomisation de la fonction d’évaluation qui devient un véritable outil de régulation de la concurrence. Une analyse comparée des situations en Belgique, France et Royaume‐Uni, tant de la demande que de l’offre de services, met en évidence les tensions récurrentes dans les objectifs de l’évaluation (qualité des services, maîtrise des budgets sociaux, création d’emploi), la faible prise en compte de la qualité de l’emploi ainsi que les limites des dispositifs standardisés d’évaluation au regard de la rhétorique du libre choix de l’usager (consommateur).     

Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impact of Labor Market Policy Reforms

This paper shows that outsourcing of parts of the workforce in unionized firms leads to wage moderation both in the case of strategic and flexible outsourcing. As long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, this wage‐moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct substitution effect so that domestic employment increases in unionized firms as outsourcing costs fall. With respect to the impact of labor tax reform changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit payments affect domestic wage setting in the same way as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant continues to be good for employment. However, except for low outsourcing activities, the impact of these policy measures will become smaller as outsourcing costs fall.     

Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very strong sense in all games. We use these discriminating types to show that any symmetric outcome which gives players more than their minmax value in material payoffs (fitness) can be seen as equilibrium play of a player population with such strongly stable preferences.     

Budget impact analysis of secukinumab versus adalimumab in the treatment of ankylosing spondylitis

Background: Biologic treatments have enhanced the treatment outcomes of patients with active ankylosing spondylitis (AS). Until recently, TNF-alpha-inhibitors have been the only biologics approved for the treatment of active AS. The objective of this study was to assess the potential financial impact of the first non-TNF-alpha biologic secukinumab (fully human IL-17A-inhibitor) vs adalimumab (TNF-alpha-inhibitor) in the treatment of AS in Finland.

Materials and methods: In this model-based budget impact analysis, patients were treated either with secukinumab (150?mg) or adalimumab (40?mg). The number of patients and market share of different biologics were based on national reimbursement registry data. Adalimumab was the most commonly used biologic treatment for AS, and in the base case analysis all adalimumab patients are assumed to switch to secukinumab. Response rates were based on a matching-adjusted indirect comparison between secukinumab and adalimumab. Patients not achieving response were switched to another biologic treatment.

Results: Treating AS patients with secukinumab instead of adalimumab leads to potential savings of 18.2 million euros within a 5-year time period. The total costs within the follow-up time were 59.5 million euros and 77.7 million euros with and without secukinumab, respectively. According to sensitivity analyses, a higher adoption rate of secukinumab corresponds to higher potential savings.

Conclusions: Secukinumab is a cost-saving treatment option compared with adalimumab in the treatment of AS in Finland. More patients could be treated with a biologic by allocating resources more efficiently.     

The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well‐defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.     

Modelling economic hysteresis losses caused by sunk adjustment costs

Transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, the authors explicitly model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles. They start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses. The authors show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hysteresis losses for producers. This could give a reason for the implementation of stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or, alternatively, to reduce the sunk entry and exit costs.     

Gini-PLS Regressions

Journal of Quantitative Economics - Data contamination and excessive correlations between regressors (multicollinearity) constitute a standard and major problem in econometrics. Two techniques...     

Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market

This article tests the public interest and regulatory capture hypotheses, in the context of the Swedish electricity market, by studying the factors influencing the Swedish Energy Agency’s decision to replace decision-makers it employs to hear customer complaints against utilities. The study covers the period from the beginning of 1996, when a series of regulatory reforms were introduced to improve consumer protection, until the end of 2008. The study concludes that decision-makers who find in favor of customers have had a statistically lower probability of being removed, consistent with public interest theory. A transitory effect of favoring utilities can be observed for the period from 2 to 6 years following the reforms. In this period, government and public scrutiny of the regulator, which had been high in the immediate aftermath of the reforms, had waned and there were few precedents decided by the courts that the regulator was required to follow. This vacuum created an opportunity for the utilities to increase their influence over the regulator. Once the courts started establishing precedents in relatively large numbers, the supervisory role of the courts ensured that the actions of the regulator were scrutinized. This development has served a similar function to government and public scrutiny in the years immediately following the reforms in promoting the public interest.     

Ad valorem versus unit taxes: monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations

Real-world industries are composed from heterogeneous firms and substantial intra-industry reallocations take place, i.e. high productivity firms squeeze out low productivity firms. Previous tax-tool comparisons have not included these central forces of industry structure. This paper examines a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and intra-industry reallocations. We show that the welfare superiority of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition is not only preserved but amplified. The additional difference between the tools arises because unit taxes distort relative prices, which in turn reduces average industry productivity through reallocations (the survival and increased market share of lower productivity firms). Importantly, numerical solutions of the model reveal that the relative welfare loss from using the unit tax increases dramatically in the degree of firm heterogeneity.