Habilitation von Ralf Hohlfeld

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Formal business process engineering based on graph grammars

Designing and managing a company's specific landscape and its business processes has been identified as a great challenge for several years. Business processes are highly dynamic and distributed and can only rarely be planned, modeled and analyzed completely. For a computer-aided business process system, which supports the designing and managing process, first of all a powerful uniform formalism is necessary, where all necessary knowledge concerning company's and its processes can be represented. In this paper we will concentrate on the introduction of such a formal methodology to describe business processes, company organization structures and information technology structures in one uniform formalism. The ideas we use are mainly based on methods from graph grammars, process management, Artificial Intelligence and business process (re)engineering.     

The road to a market economy

The ongoing conversion of the economies of former socialist countries into market economies has so far suffered from the lack of a theory of system transformation (policy) which indicates the means of achieving the desired objectives and makes it possible to evaluate the transformation policies of individual countries. The following article outlines the essential aspects of such a theory.     

Elicitation using multiple price list formats

We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects, they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental design. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C9, D81, D91 An erratum to this article is available at .     

Central governance or subsidiarity: A property-rights approach to federalism

We consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value-increasing investments. While negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium, non-contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes. If the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies, underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity (centralized governance) is superior when spillovers are weak (strong). Conversely, if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible, decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority (with majority or unanimity rule) does not.     

Borda's method applied — the right to make a proposal

Borda's vote method was used by the French Academy from 1796 to 1803 when Napoleon got it abolished. In the laws and regulations of the Academy there are stipulations regarding the election of new members. The practice is demonstrated by some examples from the protocols. In fact, Borda presented two vote methods which he showed would give the same conclusion. The method which has not been in the limelight proves to be the same one as is used for selecting the best player in chess tournaments.     

Principles for a European Union''s Public Debt

The EU has neither the power to tax nor the right to run a public debt. We analyze if the EU should receive the right for public indebtedness. We make use of the normative theory of public indebtedness and of positive political economy analysis. Our normative analysis identified specific cases for an appropriate use of public indebtedness. According to the political economy analysis, a misuse of public debt may be possible. As the implementation of strict constitutional constraints can limit this misuse, we propose the assignment of a right to public borrowing to the EU within tight constitutional restrictions.