A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information

This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of short-run players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of ‘short-run’ players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some ‘long-run’ players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and “teach” the short-run players to maximize their long-run payoffs. All players optimize noisily. The proposed model nests an agent-based quantal-response equilibrium (AQRE) and the standard equilibrium models as special cases. Using data from 28 experimental sessions of trust and entry repeated games, including 8 previously unpublished sessions, the model fits substantially better than chance and much better than standard equilibrium models. Estimates show that most of the long-run players are sophisticated, and short-run players become more sophisticated with experience.     

The political economy of corporate governance in developing economies: The case of Bangladesh

The paper investigates the influence of concentrated shareholding, boardroom politics and interest group politics in the quality of corporate governance in listed firms. It finds that the controlling shareholders exert influence in boardroom politics through family-aligned board and executive management. The evidence shows that concentrated ownership, family-aligned board and management, and political connection(s) of the controlling shareholder(s) tend to be inversely associated with the quality of corporate governance in a firm. The findings of the study suggest that the broad-based interest group politics which influence both political preference and corporate control politics contribute significantly to the current state of corporate governance in developing economies.     

Job guarantees, employability training and partnerships in the retail sector

This paper discusses the potential value of local, partnership-based employability training and job guarantee programmes, focusing on one example—the 'Alloa Initiative'. The Initiative involved an employability training and job guarantee scheme developed in partnership with Tesco, a major retailer, in preparation for the opening of one of the company's new stores. This paper reports on the outputs from this project, which placed 109 disadvantaged job seekers into positions at the store, and proved particularly effective at targeting the long-term unemployed and those with limited experience of the retail sector. The analysis is based on the findings of survey research undertaken with 86 of the 109 training course completers (a 79 per cent response rate) and all the main partners involved in the Initiative. Innovative elements of the training programme that contributed to its positive outcomes are discussed, and a model for 'managing successful partnerships' is applied, in order to identify critical factors explaining the apparent success of the Initiative. In particular, the importance of employers providing job guarantees is noted.