The Influence of Constraints and Self-Efficacies on Participation in Regular Active Recreation

This study examined the ways in which perceived constraints and self-efficacies associated with participation in active recreation influenced Hong Kong and Australian university students' interest, intention, and participation in regular active recreation. The study indicated that perceived constraints have weak negative effects whereas self-efficacies have stronger positive effects on students' interest, intention, and participation in regular active recreation. Time efficacy, persistence efficacy, and activity efficacy emerged as important indirect motivators of active recreation engagement. The influences of constraints and self-efficacies on active recreation participation mainly occurred indirectly through adjustments in participation interest and intention.     

TAUX D'INTERET EFFECTIF, VIABILITE FINANCIERE ET FINANCEMENT DES PETITS OPERATEURS ECONOMIQUES PAR LES INSTITUTIONS DE MICROFINANCE AU BENIN

RÉSUMÉ ** :  Les institutions de microfinance (IMF) ont accompli le miracle de faciliter l'accès aux services financiers à des milliers d'exclus du système bancaire classique dans les pays en développement. Mais une polémique naît quant aux coûts élevés associés auxdits services. Cette étude a évalué le niveau de taux d'intérêt viable pour la microfinance en termes d'offre de services financiers. Les résultats montrent que les micro-projets dont le taux de rentabilité interne ne dépasse pas 42% ne pourraient être financés par les institutions de microfinance. Quasiment aucune IMF n'assurerait son autosuffisance opérationnelle, donc sa pérennité en respectant le seuil légal fixéà 27%.     

Is Managerial Myopia a Persistent Governance Problem?

Critics of U.S. corporations have long argued that companies are overly focused on short‐term results and, as a consequence, sacrifice their own long‐run value and competitiveness. These criticisms have expanded in recent years to include those from prominent politicians, investors, consultants, and academics. If such criticisms have merit, they would imply a massive governance failure in which there has been decades of underinvestment with little adjustment on the part of managers, boards, or the market for corporate control. This article evaluates the economic underpinnings of these criticisms and analyzes their implications in the context of empirical evidence produced by several decades of research on corporate investment policies, the outcomes of corporate control events, investor horizons, and the market pricing of companies with little if any earnings. In reviewing the findings of these studies, the author finds little evidence to support the view that U.S. companies sacrifice long‐run value and competitiveness by systematically underinvesting. First, although U.S. companies have indeed cut back on tangible investments such as property, plant, and equipment, these cutbacks have been more than offset by the dramatic growth in investment in intangibles, such as spending on developing knowledge capital, brand‐building, and IT infrastructure. Second, when subjected to events that have the effect of reducing managerial control over investment policies and transferring control to outside investors—such as leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations, forced CEO dismissals, and shareholder activist campaigns—companies tend to reduce, not increase, investment spending. In fact, it is difficult to find any corporate control threats that have had the goal or effect of increasing investment. Third, and at the same time, the rising concentration of large institutional investors, including indexers such as BlackRock and Vanguard, suggests that investors have become, if anything, more long‐term oriented over time. Fourth, there is no evidence that the market shuns companies that have yet to report large (or indeed any) earnings. These findings suggest that curbing overinvestment, and not discouraging myopia and underinvestment, may well still be the larger corporate governance challenge facing investors when monitoring and attempting to influence the performance of U.S. companies.     

The Relevance of XBRL Voluntary Disclosure for Stock Market Valuation: The Role of Corporate Governance

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relevance for stock market pricing of accounting earnings of voluntary disclosures in XBRL files considering the quality of corporate governance. Results are the following. It appears that XBRL extensions attract financial analysts. Good governance is positively associated with voluntary XBRL extensions. We observe that XBRL extensions enhance the positive relationship between accounting earnings and stock price. However, this positive association is reduced for firms with good governance, suggesting a substitution effect between XBRL extensions and corporate governance. Finally, it appears that XBRL extensions would strategically be related to earnings quality. This research highlights the importance to consider governance when assessing the value relevance of XBRL disclosures for stock market pricing.     

Perceptions of high‐involvement work practices and burnout: the mediating role of job demands

This study examined the impact of perceived high‐involvement work practices on job demands (role conflict, role overload and role ambiguity) and burnout (emotional exhaustion and depersonalisation). The study was conducted in a Canadian general hospital. Findings from structural equation modelling (N = 545) revealed that perceived HIWPs were significantly and negatively related to job demands and burnout. Role conflict and role overload have a significant positive association with emotional exhaustion and depersonalisation. Finally, role conflict and role overload partially mediate the relationship between perceived HIWPs and burnout. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for our understanding of how HIWPs influence the job demands and burnout of employees.     

The Best Teachers I Ever Had Were ... at the Unification Theological Seminary

Teaching Business Ethics -     

Consistent price systems and arbitrage opportunities of?the?second kind in models with transaction costs

In contrast with the classical models of frictionless financial markets, market models with proportional transaction costs, even satisfying usual no-arbitrage properties, may admit arbitrage opportunities of the second kind. This means that there are self-financing portfolios with initial endowments lying outside the solvency region but ending inside. Such a phenomenon was discovered by M. Rásonyi in the discrete-time framework. In this note, we consider a rather abstract continuous-time setting and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for a property which we call no free lunch of the second kind, NFL2. We provide a number of equivalent conditions elucidating, in particular, the financial meaning of the property B which appeared as an indispensable “technical” hypothesis in previous papers on hedging (superreplication) of contingent claims under transaction costs. We show that it is equivalent to another condition on the “richness” of the set of consistent price systems, close to the condition PCE introduced by Rásonyi. In the last section, we deduce the Rásonyi theorem from our general result by using specific features of discrete-time models.