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31.
Nada Ben Elhadj-Ben Brahim Rim Lahmandi-Ayed Didier Laussel 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(6):678-689
In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising. 相似文献
32.
Jean J. Gabszewicz Didier Laussel & Nathalie Sonnac 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2002,4(3):317-334
The press industry depends in a crucial way on the possibility of financing an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts. We show that this may induce the editors of the newspapers to moderate the political message they display to their readers, compared with the political opinions they would have expressed otherwise. 相似文献
33.
We study the determination of public tuition fees through majority voting in a vertical differentiation model where agents' returns on educational investment differ and public and private universities coexist and compete in tuition fees. The private university offers higher educational quality than its competitor, incurring higher unit cost per trained student. The tuition fee for the state university is fixed by majority voting while that for the private follows from profit maximization. Then agents choose to train at the public university or the private one or to remain uneducated. The tax per head adjusts in order to balance the state budget. Because there is a private alternative, preferences for education are not single‐peaked and no single‐crossing condition holds. An equilibrium is shown to exist, which is one of three types: high tuition fee (the “ends” are a majority), low tuition fee (the “middle” is a majority), or mixed (votes tie). The cost structure determines which equilibrium obtains. The equilibrium tuition is either greater (majority at the ends) or smaller (majority at the middle) than the optimal one. 相似文献
34.
Didier Courbet Françoise Bernard Robert-Vincent Joule Severine Halimi-Falkowicz Nicolas Guéguen 《国际广告杂志》2016,35(6):949-969
The number of websites containing persuasive serious games and advergames has increased over the past several years, but their immediate and delayed effects on behavior are still not well understood. The present field experiment (n = 388, varied socio-professional groups) demonstrates that interactivity linked to this type of website provokes positive effects on immediate behavior (purchases of energy-saving light bulbs, ESLBs) in a ‘real setting.’ It further affected the behavior (installation of ESLBs at home), the memorization of the website's arguments, gains in knowledge, attitude, and other judgments regarding ESLBs, when measured two weeks later. The digital signature of a commitment to perform an expected behavior via a web page also provokes positive behavioral effects. This can accumulate through the effects of interactivity. We close with a discussion of the possible psychological processes involved, theoretical and practical implications and limitations as well as new perspectives for advertising and advergames research. 相似文献
35.
We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lower, it will be optimal to set a low first-period price, not to serve all would-be consumers at this price (selective distribution) and raise the price afterwards. Paradoxically, this strategy allows a larger customer base to be reached than in the case of pure price signalling. 相似文献
36.
Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model 下载免费PDF全文
Amani Kahloul Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed Hejer Lasram Didier Laussel 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2017,19(4):860-874
We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and one or two firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. The question in this paper is whether a decentralized choice through majority vote would lead to more or less competition. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the viewpoint of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, under concentrated ownership (where owners have a null density), duopoly is always preferred by the majority; while under egalitarian ownership (where firms are equally shared by all the population), the choice of the majority depends on the relative size of workers' and consumers' segments. 相似文献
37.
A private, profit-maximizing firm produces a public good that enters the utility functions of several users. Each of them separately designs and proposes to the firm a contract specifying a transfer payment as a function of the amount of public good supplied. The firm has to accept or to refuse each contract before knowing the realized value of a random variable that enters its cost function. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and explore some refinements ruling out Pareto inefficient equilibria.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, H41. 相似文献
38.
Francis Didier Tatoutchoup 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(1):84-107
In this paper, I analyze optimal royalty contracts in forestry when the harvesting firm has private information on the cost of harvesting. This infinite horizon forest rotation model with asymmetry of information on the cost parameter results in a dynamic incentive problem. Depending on whether the costs are correlated over time or not, the firm either receives rent or receives no rent, associated with the continuation part of the rotation choice. I characterize the optimal contract explicitly in both cases. I also examine the loss in expected welfare surplus resulting from the use of a linear contract instead of the more general non‐linear contract. 相似文献
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