Segmental new-product diffusion of residential broadband services

Aggregate models of innovation diffusion do not capitalise on valuable consumer adoption dynamics that may be useful to policy makers and market planners. The non-diffusion choice literature shows quite clearly that these dynamics may indeed be very important factors in the diffusion process. The authors present a segmental broadband diffusion model that is estimated from consumer survey data that measure the effect that household income has on its propensity to adopt this technological product. The results suggest that early broadband adopters are mostly made up from wealthy households and only as time progresses do less well off households adopt. The findings presented in this paper will be important to market planners and policy makers requiring a relatively simple technique that forecasts segmental innovation diffusion.     

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies

We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The one-candidate-per-country equilibria exhibit a “protectionist drift” owing to this delegation effect. In addition, we find an additional source of protectionist drift that we call the “abstention effect”. Not only do candidates wish to delegate to more protectionist colleagues, but these more protectionist colleagues who can win election, prefer still more protectionist candidates than themselves. Therefore, they have an incentive to abstain, that is, not run for election. We show that because of this abstention effect there exists a range of electable citizens all of whom are more protectionist than the median voter's most preferred candidate. We extend the analysis allowing two-candidate equilibria and the possibility that there are costs and benefits of holding office.     

Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach

We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies/industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition. An increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers. The firms’ aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy.     

An Explicit Mapping of Currency Target Zone Models to Option Prices*

Currency target zones have been under scrutiny for the past three decades, which led to the development of two broad classes of quantitative models: Phenomenological ones that explicitly take into consideration the market's perception of the bounded exchange rate, and more mechanical ones that rely on put and call options. Until now, the two models have only been compared qualitatively. Here, we derive, for the first time, a quantitative link between these two approaches. Specifically, we show how the former approach has to be generalized in order to recover the second one. This mapping lets us relate the phenomenological parameter of the first approach to economically well‐known quantities.     

A portfolio approach to the optimal mix of funded and unfunded pensions

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we address the optimal funding of pensions by means of portfolio choice approach. Considering the unfunded (Paygo) pension system as a ‘quasi-asset’ with hedging and diversification properties, we derive the optimal portfolio mix of funded and Paygo systems within a mean variance and Bell linear exponential models. Our analysis involves both analytical computations and empirical estimations of optimal values using real long-term data for equity, bonds and the Paygo asset for several OECD countries and several time periods covering the time span 1897–2016. We find that in most cases a mix of both systems is desirable with a larger magnitude of Paygo system in the case of the Bell framework as we capture attitudes towards asymmetry and tail risks that are typical to equity markets.     

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents, dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domestic agents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchment in both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for different types of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations driving capital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent with crises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under the presence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.     

La Participation des Adhérents Dans Leurs Coopératives Agricoles: Une Étude Exploratoire du Secteur Céréalier Français

When a farmer joins an agricultural cooperative, he or she undertakes to participate in the cooperative economically, as a co‐operator, and also in its administration, as an associate. Yet, today, researchers and directors of cooperatives are observing a drop in member participation in both spheres. The goal of this paper is to build a typology of the members of grain farmer agricultural co‐operatives in France, based on the members’ participation, and then use a multinomial probit model to identify the factors that come into play and result in a member belonging to a given category in the typology. We make the hypothesis that attitudes with respect to organizational involvement and the member's confidence in his or her co‐operative can explain these differences in behavior, along with individual variables tied to the member and his or her farm business, and variables associated with the co‐operative to which the member belongs. Following the analysis of the participation behavior of the 290 members in the sample, the members can be grouped into three distinct categories: “individualists,” “good soldiers,” and “engaged.” The results of the multinomial probit model on these three categories show, in particular, that attitude toward organizational involvement has a significant effect, as do the presence of storage on the farm and the size of the cooperative on the probability of being an “individualist” rather than a “good soldier” or “engaged.”     

An Econometric Study of Quits Rate Trends in the United States since the Great Recession: Cyclical Movement or Structural Change?

This paper attempts to identify the possible reasons behind a drop of the quits rate in the period since the Great Recession. (As defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the quits rate is the number of quits during the entire month as a percent of total employment.) The paper examines several essential questions on the quits rate using econometric models and analysis: What are the crucial determinants that explain the movements in the quits rate? Is the postrecession stagnation of the quits rate a result of current cyclical macroeconomic conditions, or does it reflect a structural change? As far as we know, no recent research has attempted to model this indicator to answer these questions. Quits rate data have been systematically collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) only since the end of year 2000. By dividing our data set into 12 industrial categories and four regions, we are able to come up with empirical models to explain quits rate behavior over a consecutive time span and also across industries and regions. After developing our model, we are then able to examine if there is evidence of structural change using several methods.     

Identification and critical time forecasting of real estate bubbles in the USA

We present a hybrid model for diagnosis and critical time forecasting of real estate bubbles. The model combines two elements: (1) the Log Periodic Power Law Singular model to describe endogenous price dynamics originated from positive feedback loops among economic agents; and (2) a diffusion index that creates a parsimonious representation of multiple macroeconomic variables. We explicitly compare the in-sample and out-sample behaviour of our model on the housing price indices of 380 US metropolitan areas. Empirical results suggest that the model is able to forecast the end of the bubbles and to identify the variables that are highly relevant during the bubble regime.     

Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information

We obtain the optimal contract for the government (principal) to regulate a manager (agent) who has a taste for empire-building that is his/her private information. This taste for empire-building is modeled as a utility premium that is proportional to the difference between the contracted output and a reference output. We find that output is distorted upward when the manager’s taste for running large firms is weak, downward when it is strong, and equals a reference output when it is intermediate (in this case, the participation constraint is binding). We also obtain an endogenous reference output (equal to the expected output, which depends on the reference output), and find that the response of output to cost is null in the short-run (in which the reference output is fixed), whenever the manager’s type is in the intermediate range, and negative in the long-run (after the adjustment of the reference output to equal expected output).