Factors with significant impact on efficiency of research laboratories: case of the public university

Quality & Quantity - This work aims to highlight the factors with significant impact on efficiency of research laboratories of public university. To achieve this goal, Linear Regression is...     

The effects of ownership structure,sub-optimal cash holdings and investment inefficiency on dividend policy: evidence from Indonesia

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We investigate how a firm’s decision to hold excessive cash or to overinvest could influence its dividend payout policy in Indonesia....     

The unintended consequences of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on managerial ability

I investigate the impact of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on managerial ability and predict that clawback provisions will motivate managers to exert more efforts following the adoption of clawback and these efforts will be in the form of an increased managerial efficiency. Using a propensity score matched sample of firms, I find a significant positive association between voluntary clawback adoption and the change in both rank and score of managerial ability. My study highlights the unintended consequences of clawback provisions on CEO's behavior and contributes to the on-going debate on the importance of proactively and carefully drafting clawback policies, further signifying the importance of the SEC's efforts (Rule 10D-1) to enforce clawback policies.     

Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing

In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that are designed to improve a queue's efficiency by allowing customers to trade places. In the server‐initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer in the queue and distributes the proceeds among the remaining customers. In the customer‐initiated auction, new arrivals can sequentially trade places with queued customers. We use two novel experimental protocols to examine the behavioral properties of both auction mechanisms. We find that both auction mechanisms improve a queue's efficiency on average and that both perform equally well in terms of efficiency gain. We also find evidence of the sunk‐cost effect but not of the endowment effect. Participants indicated that they found the server‐initiated auction a fairer mechanism than the customer‐initiated auction. When voting between the two auctions, the participants tended to favor the server‐initiated auction.     

Do people trust more when they are happy or when they are sad? Evidence from an experiment

This paper deals with the role played by incidental emotions on trust decisions. Based on a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, we explore the way positive and negative emotions impact transfers in a trust game. In addition, we investigate the mechanism through which risk intervenes in the relationship between emotions and trust. Our results suggest that negative emotions influence trust positively, whereas positive emotions decrease trust. This effect disappears once risk is included to the game. Furthermore, we found that transfer in the trust game is driven by other‐regarding preferences and by risk preferences.     

A Stackelberg game-based approach for interactions among Internet service providers and content providers

NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking - This paper studies non-neutral market share where Internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery....     

Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance Matter?

Journal of Business Ethics - We conduct an experiment to investigate the joint effects of advisor reassurance and advice source in enhancing the impact of advice on auditors’ whistleblowing...     

Inefficiency and heterogeneity in Turkish banking: 1990–2000

Recent studies have stressed the importance of privatization and openness to foreign competition for bank efficiency and economic growth. We study bank efficiency in Turkey, an emerging economy with great heterogeneity in bank types and ownership structures. Earlier studies of Turkish banking had three limitations: (i) excessive reliance on cost‐function frontier analyses, wherein volume of loans is a measure of banking output; (ii) pooling all banks or imposing ad hoc heterogeneity assumptions; and (iii) lack of a comprehensive panel data set for proper analysis of productivity and heterogeneity. We use an estimation–classification procedure to find likelihood‐driven classification of bank technologies in an 11‐year panel. In addition, we augment traditional cost‐frontier analysis with a labour‐efficiency analysis. We conclude that state banks are not particularly inefficient overall, but that they do utilize labour inefficiently. This partially supports recent calls for privatization. We also conclude that special finance houses (or Islamic banks) utilize the same technology as conventional domestic banks, and do so relatively efficiently. This suggests that they do not cause harm to the financial system. Finally, we conclude that foreign banks utilize a different technology from domestic ones. This suggests that one should not overstate their value to the financial sector. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The microstructural foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility

We show that typical behaviors of market participants at the high frequency scale generate leverage effect and rough volatility. To do so, we build a simple microscopic model for the price of an asset based on Hawkes processes. We encode in this model some of the main features of market microstructure in the context of high frequency trading: high degree of endogeneity of market, no-arbitrage property, buying/selling asymmetry and presence of metaorders. We prove that when the first three of these stylized facts are considered within the framework of our microscopic model, it behaves in the long run as a Heston stochastic volatility model, where a leverage effect is generated. Adding the last property enables us to obtain a rough Heston model in the limit, exhibiting both leverage effect and rough volatility. Hence we show that at least part of the foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility can be found in the microstructure of the asset.