AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

MEASURING HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS FOR FAS 133 COMPLIANCE

Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 133 requires business entities to document their anticipation of hedge effectiveness in order to qualify for hedge accounting treatment of gains and losses from financial derivatives. In the absence of specific guidelines, the accounting industry has espoused the "80–125" rule for determining hedge effectiveness. But the authors observe that meaningful assessment of anticipated hedge effectiveness must consider two distinct aspects of a firm's hedging strategy: (1) the strength of the hedging relationship, which is determined by the choice of the hedging instrument; and (2) the position taken in the hedging instrument relative to the holdings of the hedged item. They take both aspects of hedging into consideration in developing alternative measures of hedge effectiveness and distinguishing between the potential and attained effectiveness of a particular hedge. This approach enables the user to evaluate the relative merits of alternative hedging strategies to support risk management decisions, and also to document a selected hedging strategy's anticipated effectiveness for purposes of compliance with FAS 133. While the authors endorse a fairly broad interpretation of hedge effectiveness, their approach can also be used in the narrower context of an "80–125" rule.     

Review Article

Linda Clarke, Peter de Gijsel & Jörn Janssen (eds) (2000) The Dynamics of Wage Relations in the New Europe (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic)ISBN 0-7923-7742-7 £83 368 pp.     

A Statement of Accounting Concepts for Level 1 of the Conceptual Framework?

The type of reporting found in corporate governance includes financial reporting, but over time various arguments have developed regarding a tension found between conventional and financial type reporting, especially as to the role of financial statements. Further tensions follow from the introduction of economic and social issues within both conventional accounting and financial reports.
This article argues that distinct, though related, frameworks at particular levels are required. The mingling of conventional accounting with financial and economic ideas and issues is evident in the conceptual framework (CF) project where there is reference to economic benefits and costs in making economic decisions for the allocation of resources. This results in a misconception of the function of these distinct types of information. An unravelling of particular issues will require a Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) for Level 1 of the CF.     

Discontinuous innovation and supply relationships: strategic dalliances

The authors address the need for supply relationships to generate, support, and respond to discontinuous innovation (DI), noting that established ways of working appear insufficient. The peculiarities of DI are explained and contrasted with well-known concepts within innovation. The need for customer firms to be both closely collaborative with suppliers while also exploring potential, unpredictable DI elsewhere is proposed, by means of strategic dalliances . A model is presented for understanding and exploring this emerging management challenge.     

Discussion of “Earnings Surprises,Growth Expectations,and Stock Returns,or, Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio”

Review of Accounting Studies -     

A comparison of Ad valorem and per unit taxes in regulated monopolies

This paper compares the output and revenue effects in the rate-of-return regulated monopoly model. Both the ad valorem and the unit tax generally decrease the use of capital, and as such, reduce the output and raise the price. In addition, it is shown that Suits and Musgrave's conclusion of higher revenue of an ad valorem tax at a given output can apply to a regulated monopolist if the marginal product of labor under the ad valorem tax is greater than or equal to that under the unit tax. Similarly, their second conclusion, that for a given tax revenue an ad valorem tax has a larger output than a unit tax rate before the revenue-maximizing tax rate, can also apply to the regulated monopolist.     

A conceptual model of corporate moral development

The conceptual model presented in this article argues that corporations exhibit specific behaviors that signal their true level of moral development. Accordingly, the authors identify five levels of moral development and discuss the dynamics that move corporations from one level to another. Examples of corporate behavior which are indicative of specific stages of moral development are offered.R. Eric Reidenbach is Professor of Marketing and Director of the Center for Business Development and Research at the University of Southern Mississippi. He has written extensively on business and marketing ethics.Donald P. Robin, Professor of Business Ethics and Professor of Marketing at the University of Southern Mississippi, is coauthor with R. Eric Reidenbach of two recent books on business ethics with Prentice-Hall. He is a frequent lecturer on business ethics and is the author of several articles on the subject.     

The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry

This paper analyzes the trade-off between risk and incentives in the share contracts of the American whaling industry. Using a newly collected panel of 5378 individuals who sailed on more than 1000 whaling voyages from 1855–68, the response of sailors’ compensation to an increase in risk is estimated. The risks used to identify this response resulted from the commerce-raiding naval vessels of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As the Confederate cruisers sailed primarily in the Atlantic, and therefore posed far less of a threat to whaling voyages to other oceans, a quasi-experimental approach focusing on the differences between Atlantic voyages compared to others is implemented. The results are consistent with a negative trade-off between risk and incentives in the industry’s contracts. Moreover, evidence is found of selection among less risk-averse sailors and merchants into riskier voyages during the war.