Revisiting the democracy-private investment nexus: Does inequality matter?

Contrary to the predictions of a large theoretical literature, recent cross-country evidence suggests autocracies can generate statistically indistinguishable levels of private investment compared to democracies. We argue that the previous exclusion of inequality explains part of this puzzle. We model current investment as a function of investors’ beliefs about future tax rates, which are conditioned by the constraints on the Executive in setting tax rates and expropriating tax revenues. In democracies, where tax rates reflect the preferences of the median voter, investment declines with rising inequality. In autocracies, investor beliefs about future tax rates reflect the relative power of Elites compared to the Executive. As inequality rises, the increased resources available to Elites constrains the Executive’s ability to expropriate more tax revenues. The heterogeneous determinants of investor beliefs can explain the observed pattern of investment across regime types. We first test our predictions at the macro-level with cross-country data. We then test the behavioral underpinnings of our model with a novel laboratory experiment showing how inequality affects individual-level investment behavior dependent upon regime type. Results from both types of analyses show that when inequality is taken into account autocracies can generate similar levels of investment to democracies.     

Tax structure,size of government,and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938

We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.      

I can do that alone…or not? How idea generators juggle between the pros and cons of teamwork

Research summary: The advantages of working with a team to develop an idea are well established, but surprisingly, little is known about why some idea generators ignore these advantages by developing their ideas alone. To answer this question, we study two important trade‐offs. First, working with a team provides access to additional resources but also leads to increased coordination costs. Second, sharing the risks and costs of developing an idea necessitates sharing the potential rewards of a successful idea. We use unique data on idea generators and their submission of ideas to an innovation program in a large European company between 1996 and 2008 to show how the two different trade‐offs affect the decision of idea generators to collaborate with a team. Managerial summary: Organizations usually form teams to develop and execute innovative ideas. When people have the choice, however, will they also form a team or will they develop ideas alone? By studying idea generators and their voluntary submissions of breakthrough ideas to an innovation program, we find that the success rate is much higher for team ideas. Although teamwork has important benefits, idea generators will often develop incremental ideas alone and only accept increased coordination costs for developing radical ideas—this is even more so when they have prior team experiences. Moreover, only when idea generators were successful before and—even more so—when they developed that idea alone, will they be more open to sharing the rewards and risks of developing another idea with a team.     

What is the Appropriate Counterfactual When Estimating Effects of Multilateral Trade Policy Reform?

Multilateral trade reforms, such as may eventually emerge from the WTO's Doha Development Agenda (DDA), tend to be phased in over a decade or so after agreement is reached. Given the DDA's slow progress, that implementation may not be completed before the end of the next decade. Ex‐ante analysis of the DDA's possible effects thus requires first modelling the world economy to 2030 and, in that process, projecting what trade‐related policies might be by then without a DDA. Typically, modellers assume the counterfactual policy regime to be a ‘business‐as‐usual’ projection assuming the status quo. Yet we know developing country governments tend to switch from taxing to assisting farmers in the course of economic development. This paper shows the difference made by including political economy‐determined agricultural protection growth endogenously in the baseline projection. We reveal that difference by projecting the world economy to 2030 using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model with those two alternative policy regimes and then simulating a move to global free trade (the maximum benefit from a multilateral trade reform) in each of those two cases. The welfare effects of removing the counterfactual price distortions in 2030 are shown to be much larger in the case where agricultural protection grows endogenously than in the case assuming no policy changes over the projection period. This suggests the traditional way of estimating effects of a multilateral agricultural trade agreement may considerably understate the potential welfare gains.     

The price effects of greening vacant lots: How neighborhood attributes matter

We identify the effects of greening vacant lots on nearby housing prices and show how neighborhood attributes matter to these outcomes. Using data from a longstanding program in Philadelphia, we find that prices for houses within 1,000 feet of a greened vacant lot rise by about 4%, consistent with the literature, with the effect size increasing over time. Using the extensive data available in Philadelphia, we show how these effects vary by the attributes of the neighborhood in which they occur, with larger effects in areas with a high share of vacant land and higher-than-average median household incomes, with peak responses estimated at 19% and 15%, respectively. We demonstrate the importance of sample selection bias adjustment for identification of the effect of vacant lot greening.