Business regulation and labor market performance around the world

Using data from 74 industrial, developing and transition countries for the years 2000–2003, this paper analyzes empirically whether and to what extent anticompetitive business regulations affect the performance of the labor market. According to the regression results, they appear to increase unemployment rates and lower employment rates. It seems that they particularly worsen the employment situation of young people. Our results are robust to variations in specification.      

Venture capital availability and labour market performance around the world

This article studies the effects of venture capital on the performance of the labour market. Using data from a much larger sample of countries than previous papers, it finds more readily available venture capital to favourably affect both the unemployment and the employment rate. The magnitude of the estimated effects is substantial. We control for both endogeneity of venture capital availability and most major determinants of labour market performance. The results are robust to variations in specification.     

Central Bank Independence,Wage Bargaining,and Labor Market Performance: New Evidence

Using data on 20 industrial countries over the period 1982 to 2003, this article finds central bank independence to favorably affect both unemployment and employment rates. The size of these effects appears to be substantial, particularly in the long term. In contrast to some of the previous literature, the article finds that the favorable effects of central bank independence do not depend on the degree of wage bargaining centralization or coordination. Furthermore, it finds that higher centralization as well as higher coordination of wage bargaining may also have favorable direct effects on labor market performance.     

Lobbying Bureaucrats*

We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.     

The Quality of Industrial Relations and Unemployment in Developing Countries

Using data from 45 countries for six years in the period 1995 to 2003, the author analyses whether the quality of industrial relations affects unemployment in developing countries. To measure the quality of industrial relations, the author uses the results of surveys in which senior business executives characterized the industrial relations of their countries of residence. According to the regression results, cooperative (confrontational) industrial relations are likely to lower (increase) unemployment. In general, the magnitude of the effect appears to be moderate. It seems to be small among women. The results are robust to variations in specification.     

Internal and external suppliers in manufacturing networks—An empirical analysis

The purpose of the paper is to explore the way manufacturing firms use internal and external suppliers in the design and management of manufacturing networks. The main area of interest is to explore the similarities and differences between internal and external suppliers, with respect to their roles and the reasons for choosing a certain type of supplier. We base our analysis on data from 104 Swedish manufacturing plants and their corresponding manufacturing networks of internal and external suppliers. The results of the study show that there are significant differences between the criteria that are influential in choosing a certain type of supplier. The choice of an internal supplier is largely based on a single corporate decision, while an external supplier has to perform well on a number of criteria (primarily quality, cost, and delivery dependability). When comparing the selection criteria with competitive priorities and plant performance, we find that the criteria for selecting external suppliers has a better match than those for selecting internal suppliers. The sample contained plants having only external suppliers as well as plants having both internal and external suppliers, but the selection criteria for external suppliers are the same for both groups and not dependent upon the presence or absence of internal suppliers.     

Business regulation,labor force participation and employment in industrial countries

Using data from 19 industrial countries for 5 years in the period 1990–2002, this paper analyzes to what extent anticompetitive business regulations, like price controls and administrative obstacles to start a new business, affect labor force participation and employment rates. According to the regression results, they appear to lower both. Corruption, which is one result of strict business regulation, is also found to lower labor force participation and employment rates. While most effects on the general population seem to be modest, the effects on the low-skilled are likely to be substantial. The results are robust to variations in specification.     

Economic and political risks of European Monetary Union

As demonstrated by the last European Union summit meetings, the heads of government and of state of the EU's member states appear firmly intent on starting the planned monetary union on schedule on 1st January 1999. The statements they make, and also any pamphlets and advertisements published by their governments and the European Commission, tend to concentrate one-sidedly on the purported advantages of monetary union. Nevertheless, in most EU countries plans for monetary union are greeted with scepticism or disapproval by a large section of the general public. There are good reasons for this reaction because, as will be explained below, European Monetary Union is in fact associated with serious economic and political risks.