Sessions organized by the Industrial Organization Society at the ASSA Meetings,Washington D.C., January 6–8, 1995

Sessions organized by the Industrial Organization Society at the ASSA Meetings, Washington D.C., January 6–8, 1995     

Due diligence and the demand for electricity: A cautionary tale

In 1983, the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) defaulted on tax-free revenue bonds issued to construct two of its five nuclear power plants. In subsequent litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that the bonds had been fraudulently issued because WPPSS and the other defendants should reasonably have known and disclosed that there was substantial uncertainty about the ability to meet the financial obligations created by the bonds. A model using plausible values for demand elasticities, recognized probabilities of events that would increase costs and delay construction and data used by WPPSS to construct demand forecasts for prospective bondholders suggests that such uncertainty was present at the time the bonds were issued. The values for demand elasticities and other parameters of the model were selected after a thorough review of the econometric literature on demand for electricity, beginning with the work of Fisher and Kaysen in 1962.     

The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance*

In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:

• ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
• ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
• ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.

     

A Review of: THE EVALUATION OF RISKY INTERRELATED INVESTMENTS by Frederick S. Hillier

The flood of publications and seminars on activity costing in the last few years suggests that companies suddenly encountered a need for better management accounting information in the 1980s. In fact, management accounting's relevance to most business decision-making deteriorated steadily since the 1950s. However, most companies did not perceive these inadequacies in management accounting until the early 1980s. Current interest in activity management and activity costing reflects the convergence around 1980 of two forces: a long-undetected set of problems in management accounting that seems to originate in the 1950s; and the growth of new competitive pressures in the 1970s that made companies acutely aware of these problems. Although these two forces arose independently, their interaction in the 1970s led to the rise of activity-based management thinking. This paper describes the past, present, and future of activity-based management: past uses of financial accounting information that confounded companies' efforts to plan marketing strategies and to control operations after the 1950s; present ideas for solving these problems with activity-based management concepts such as activity costing; and the likely future direction of activity-based management thought.     

Advertising as special service provision under non-price vertical restraints: exclusive territories in beer distribution

This article presents statistical evidence which supports Lester Telser's 1960 hypothesis, that when vertical restraints are made illegal, intrabrand competition results which diminishes the provision of point-of-sale, special services. This results because of the public goods problem exhibited by the special services. Increased special service provision by the national manufacturer must then substitute for the special service provision left unfilled by the wholesaler. Evidence relating to the efficacy of such substitution is also presented.     

The Economics Olympics: Ranking U.S. Economics Departments Based on Prizes,Medals, and Other Awards

This study ranks the top 25 U.S. economics departments on the basis of four prestigious awards won/held by these departments' current faculty: the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, the John Bates Clark Medal, the American Economic Association's (AEA's) Distinguished Fellow Award, and the American Economic Association's Richard T. Ely Lecturer. Based on our methodology, the top economics department is affiliated with the University of Chicago. This distinction stems from its affiliation with six Nobel Prize winners, four Clark Medal winners, and two participants each in the AEA Distinguished Fellow and Richard T. Ely Lecturer categories.     

Academic scholarship,organization prestige,and the earnings of U.S. business school deans

This study models the market for business school deans as an outcome of a differential game between a university's central administration and the job candidates in the market for business school deans. In our model, the ability of a business school dean to advance the organization is enhanced by his or her own scholarly reputation, such that a job candidate chooses an optimal level of scholarship that relates to his or her marketability. In this way, the supply of scholarship (by job candidates) can be seen as the supply of job candidates in the market for business school deans, whereas the demand for scholarship can be seen as the demand for business school deans. The main features of our game‐theoretic model are tested using data from both national and regional business schools and colleges in the U.S. Econometric results indicate that each additional scholarly contribution by a business school dean generates a wage premium ranging from $1,000 to $1,200, whereas in the case of national institutions, each additional student enrolled at the doctoral (master's) level raises the wage by $671 ($56). Lastly, the production of between nine and 10 scholarly contributions is found to be necessary in order to face a 50% probability of holding a business school deanship at a national institution, whereas production of about 37 scholarly contributions leads to a 50% probability of holding a deanship with a named business school at a national institution.     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.