Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.     

Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.     

Factors that affect accountant's perceptions of alternative work arrangements

Advances in technology have impacted accounting careers with resulting changes in where, when and how accountants perform their job duties. In addition, employee attitudes towards, and need for, better work/life balance has led to more firms offering alternate work arrangements (AWA). Research suggests that AWA programs can lead to many benefits for both employers and employees. Despite the prevalence of these programs there are relatively few accountants working under these arrangements and concerns about work/life balance continue. This study examines factors that shape perceptions of the cost and benefits associated with the adoption and/or support of AWAs across work culture, gender and participation experience. Our results suggest that work environment had a significant effect on perceptions of AWAs. Public accountants perceived greater costs related to career advancement but correspondingly less concern about administrative issues than management accountants. We also found that accountants who have participated (or are currently participating in an AWA), perceived greater benefits and less concern for potential negative consequences to their careers than non-participants. Finally, women perceived greater benefits to result from participation in an AWA and men perceived correspondingly more costs. Regardless, both genders perceived that AWAs were not strictly a women's issue. These findings contribute to our understanding of alternate work arrangements and point to factors that must be addressed to increase the acceptance and success of these programs.     

HEDGING INTEREST RATE RISK UNDER TERM STRUCTURE EFFECTS: AN APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

In this paper we investigate the use of the structured full rank model for hedging the balance sheet of a financial institution. Simulation results suggest that the optimal hedge is insensitive to changes in parameter estimates. In addition, we hedge a portfolio of Treasury bills using both the full information covariance matrix and the structured covariance matrix. We then contrast these results with those obtained from a duration-based model. Empirical results suggest that the structured full rank model is generally more effective in hedging applications than either the full information model or duration-based model.     

Drug testing in the transportation industry: The maritime case

The maritime industry provides an interesting case study of the design and implementation of drug-testing programs in the transportation industry during the 1980s. It is clear that such programs were designed and implemented less because of empirical evidence of safety problems than for political reasons. The results in the maritime industry are indicative of a program that is expensive to operate, intrusive with regard to employee privacy, and which will have little or no impact on safety. Focusing such programs on the issue of impairment rather than on the issue of drug usage per se is likely to improve the outcome of the programs. Although, despite common belief, there is little evidence that drug usage or the “drug problem” in U.S. society as a whole had gotten worse in the preceding years (Schonsheck, 1989, 250–251).