稳健的银行系统:金融监管在反周期中充当何种角色

本次金融危机之后,各国对金融监管体制进行了深刻的反思,也提出了许多改革方案,特别是越来越多人希望巴塞尔II以及其他监管体系能够较少地顺周期。世界银行经济学家杰勒德·卡普里奥分析了反周期监管的内在原理。反周期的拔备（或资本）要求是获得顺周期的一个重要途径,西班牙和哥伦比亚是实施反周期拨备的为数不多的国家,虽然实施时间太短而不能完全说明问题,但有限的实践结果显示与预期有差距。作者进一步分析了反周期的拨备和资本要求在实际运用中需考虑的具体问题,并为发展中国家降低金融风险提出了建议。     

Adoption of soil conservation practices in Belgium: An examination of the theory of planned behaviour in the agri-environmental domain

Soil erosion is a problem with serious on-site and off-site consequences. There exists a broad series of measures to mitigate soil erosion, unfortunately policy makers observe little voluntary adoption. This paper reports on a study to elicit the factors explaining adoption of soil erosion control practices in Belgium. Following a socio-psychological approach, the theory of planned behaviour (TPB), adoption of cover crops, reduced tillage and buffer strips is evaluated using linear regression techniques. Results show that the most explaining factor is attitude towards the soil conservation practice. The TPB adapted to include perceived control and difficulty appears to provide a suitable framework for evaluating adoption of erosion control measures in Belgium. Future interventions directed at promoting erosion control measures should be directed at changing the attitude of farmers. Further study is, however, required in order to elucidate the cognitive foundations of the negative attitude of a majority of farmers towards the implementation of erosion control practices.     

Factors That Impact the Reporting of Customer aggression and Agency decisions to Correct Customer Aggression

Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal - Most research concerning customer aggression focuses on antecedents of customer aggression, the coping strategies targets of customer aggression use,...     

Royalty Stacking and Validity Challenges: The Inverse Cournot Effect*

This paper shows that the well-known royalty-stacking problem is not robust to considering licensors with patents of heterogeneous strength due to the Inverse Cournot effect. The incentives for a downstream producer to challenge a weak patent in court increase when the total royalty rate is lower. The Inverse Cournot effect generates a moderation force in the royalty rate of strong patent holders forcing weak licensors to reduce their royalties to avoid litigation and causing an increase in output. This effect is mitigated when all firms have weak patents, making royalty stacking a more relevant concern in that case.     

A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout

This paper proposes a framework to analyze holdout in patent licensing negotiations. We show that when the validity of a patent is probabilistic, a potential downstream user has incentives to shun to pay the price offered by a patent holder to license the technology and risk being brought to court. These incentives are exacerbated when jurisdictions are local, and the downstream producer can approach courts sequentially. The informational spillovers across trials imply that this firm often finds optimal to go to court aiming to invalidate the patent in a jurisdiction due to the knock-on effect on future jurisdictions. This process results in excessive litigation compared to when the jurisdiction is global. The distortions from sequential litigation are likely to be aggravated when final competition is accounted for or when patent injunctions are not allowed.