Designing the European Road Safety Observatory

The unavailability of consistent traffic accident data and road safety information limits the opportunities to provide target approaches to reduce road crashes. The European commission has decided to meet the demand for this data by establishing a new Road Safety Observatory. The structure and much of the initial content is being developed within the SafetyNet Integrated Project. This paper describes the structure of its key components.     

MARKET ECONOMIES WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

I consider a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labor. I represent economic decision makers as “consumer–producers,” who consume as well as produce commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a nontrivial social division of labor is guided by Increasing Returns to Specialization (IRSpec) in production. Under IRSpec, I show existence of competitive equilibria, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterize these equilibria. Markets equilibrate through the adjustment of the social division of labor; the production technologies completely determine the equilibrium prices.     

Marital Status and Earnings Management

In this note, we examine the effect of CEO marital status on the riskiness of financial reporting. Using multiple proxies, we find that firms headed by a single CEO display a higher degree of earnings management than those headed by a married CEO. The effect is economically significant. Our results persist in an instrumental variable regression, suggesting that our results are not driven by innate heterogeneity in preferences.     

Network potentials

A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants within a social network. In this paper we investigate network payoff functions that admit an exact network potential or an ordinal network potential. We also investigate exact and ordinal potentials of Myerson’s non-cooperative network formation game based on consent in link formation. We show that the admittance of certain of these network and game-theoretic potentials implies the existence of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of network formation processes. Our main results extend and strengthen the current insights in the literature on game theoretic approaches to social network formation. We thank Matt Jackson and Sudipta Sarangi for extensive discussions on the subject of this paper. Part of this research was done while S. Chakrabarti was at Bonn on a post-doctoral research fellowship. We thank the Department of Economics at the University of Bonn for their hospitality and financial support. Part of this research was done at the Center for Economic Research at Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. R. P. Gilles financially supported from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant # 46-550, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Testing for Localization Using Micro-Geographic Data

To study the detailed location patterns of industries, and particularly the tendency for industries to cluster relative to overall manufacturing, we develop distance-based tests of localization. In contrast to previous studies, our approach allows us to assess the statistical significance of departures from randomness. In addition, we treat space as continuous instead of using an arbitrary collection of geographical units. This avoids problems relating to scale and borders. We apply these tests to an exhaustive U.K. data-set. For four-digit industries, we find that (i) 52% of them are localized at a 5% confidence level, (ii) localization mostly takes place at small scales below 50 km, (iii) the degree of localization is very skewed, and (iv) industries follow broad sectoral patterns with respect to localization. Depending on the industry, smaller establishments can be the main drivers of both localization and dispersion. Three-digit sectors show similar patterns of localization at small scales as well as a tendency to localize at medium scales.     

Employment protection, international specialization, and innovation

We develop a model to analyze the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The key idea is that countries with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Consequently, their researchers tend to specialize in ‘secondary innovation’ which improves existing products, rather than ‘primary innovation’ which introduces new products. This is roughly consistent with the observed pattern of R&D in Europe versus the U.S. Employment protection does not necessarily harm the country where it prevails, but typically reduces world welfare and the world number of goods.     

Matching processes in the labour market an econometric study

This paper presents empirical results on matching in the labour market in Marseilles (France). Using a sample of meetings between employers and workers organized by a local employment office, we infer from estimation results that selection among applicants is on the basis of their level of education. The strength of this selection bias is substantially caused by the poor quality of the screening performed by the employment office. Employers appear also to discriminate against the youngest applicants, the long-term unemployed and applicants of North-African extraction. These effects are alleviated when employers face a labour supply constraint in the labour market.     

Bubbles as payoffs at infinity

Summary We define rational bubbles to be securities with payoffs occurring in the infinitely distant future and investigate the behavior of bubbles values. We extend our analysis to a setting of uncertainty. In an infinite horizon arbitrage-free model of asset prices, we interpret the money market account as the value of a particular bubble; a similar interpretation holds for other assets related to the state-price deflator and to payoffs on bonds maturing in the distant future. We present three applications of this characterization of bubbles.This paper was circulated under the title Stochastic bubbles in Markov economies. We acknowledge with gratitude numerous conversations with Mark Fisher, the editorial advice of David Levine and the useful comments of anonymous referees. This paper should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.     

Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed

We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non-linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We calibrate the model using data on a French watershed and we simulate the optimal second-best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers.Authorship is equally assigned among the different authors.     

Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects,nonessential private goods and convex costs

Summary In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.hank Dolf Talman and an anonymous referee for many useful remarks and annotations of a previous draft of this paper.