Identification of monetary policy in SVAR models: a data-oriented perspective

In the literature using short-run timing restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks in vector-auto-regressions (VAR) there is a debate on whether (i) contemporaneous real activity and prices or (ii) only data typically observed with high frequency should be assumed to be in the information set of the central bank when the interest rate decision is taken. This paper applies graphical modeling theory, a data-based tool, in a small-scale VAR of the US economy to shed light on this issue. Results corroborate the second type of assumption.     

Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.     

Social Preferences,Sorting, and Competition*

In this paper, I investigate how an increase in competition for workers influences the impact of social preferences on labor‐market outcomes. By sorting themselves into firms with homogeneous work forces, workers can ensure that they suffer less from social comparisons. Competition promotes choice and thus facilitates sorting. However, competition also boosts rent differences in the labor market, because firms cannot curb internal inequity among its employees without losing workers to competitors. To reduce their exposure to social comparisons, workers might engage in inefficient sorting into unemployment. Consequently, social preferences can have strong effects (i.e., unemployment) in a competitive labor market, whereas they only have a slight impact on labor‐market outcomes in a monopsony.     

Price Volatility and Risk Exposure: On the Interaction of Quota and Product Markets

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is??whether it is ??clean?? or ??dirty????and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, a grandfathering regime??where clean firms are allocated no quotas and dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions??minimizes the impact on firm behavior relative to a risk-neutral benchmark.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour. Allowing for abatement does not change the qualitative nature of our results.     

How risk influences the choice of governance mode in biopharmaceutical inter-firm relationships

This paper proposes a new theoretical framework for assessing the influence of risk in shaping the governance form in biopharmaceutical inter-firm relationships. In particular, we propose a multidimensional operationalization of relational and performance risk and, by following Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Real Options (RO) theory constructs, we hypothesize a relation between the aforementioned risk components and the choice of governance form. Specifically, following TCE reasoning, we hypothesize that a high level of relational risk leads towards more hierarchical governance forms, while, following RO theory, we hypothesize that a high level of performance risk leads toward market-oriented governance forms; finally, we hypothesize a moderating effect of each risk component on the other. We empirically test our framework through the analysis of 353 inter-firm relationships signed worldwide between pharmaceutical and biotech companies from 2007 to 2010. The results show substantive support for our theoretical framework. Furthermore, we find a significant moderating effect of the performance risk on the TCE relation between relational risk and governance forms.     

Decision parameters in global R&D management

This paper addresses the question of which variables have what kind of impact on the decision to locate new R&D facilities in countries different from the home country of a corporation. In the first section of the paper we demonstrate the complexity of this question by referring to empirical research, managerial statements and literature. We then develop a conceptual model for the location decision of international R&D activities. This is based on Porter's (1990) framework of the factors constituting the competitive advantage of nations. In the final section of this paper we show how such a model helps us to understand and also to explain a number of management issues related to global R&D activities.     

Gene-environment interactions and the complexity of human genetic diseases

In the assessment of mortality and morbidity risk, the ability of family history and genetic test results to predict the age of occurrence, severity, and long-term prognosis of 'genetic' diseases is important. An increasing number of gene-gene and gene-environment interactions have been demonstrated in a number of monogenic Mendelian diseases. These interactions can significantly modify the clinical presentation (disease phenotype) of diseases previously regarded purely as 'genetic.' As a result, 'genetic' diseases can be positioned in a continuum between classic Mendelian and complex disease where the extremes, pure genetic or solely non-genetic, do not exist. The position of any given disease in this continuum is defined by three components: the major gene(s) contributing to the phenotype, the variability added by modifier genes and the significance of environmental factors influencing the phenotype. As the predictive value of genetic test results can be significantly influenced by additional genetic and environmental risk factors, a better understanding of these factors may influence the quantification of mortality and morbidity risk.     

A Backward Induction Experiment

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C78.