Teaching digital models: secondary technology teachers’ experiences

International Journal of Technology and Design Education - In secondary technology education, models of artifacts, systems and processes, visualized and simulated through digital tools (digital...     

Political institutions and corporate risk-taking: International evidence

Tapping into firm-level accounting data across 90 countries over a 26-year period, we find that sound political institutions are positively associated with corporate risk-taking. This result is economically significant, robust to alternative proxies for corporate risk-taking and political institutions, and continues to hold after mitigating endogeneity concerns of political institutions. We also collect evidence that sound political institutions may compensate for weak legal institutions in inducing corporate risk-taking. We argue that sound political institutions improve the investment environment for firms and can induce higher levels of corporate risk-taking, which is ultimately associated with economic growth.     

Non-executive directorship importance and takeover hostility: Australian evidence

This study investigates the importance of the target firm directorship to target firm non-executive directors during takeovers. Using Australian data and a size-based measure of directorship importance, we find a positive association between takeover hostility and directorship importance after controlling for takeover premiums and target firm size. Further analysis reveals that directorship importance leads to a greater likelihood of offer price revisions following initial rejection of a takeover bid, but not the likelihood of bid success. Our findings are consistent with target firm non-executive directors exhibiting self-serving behaviour at directorships which they consider more important to their reputation.     

An evaluation of the impacts of the adoption of IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers

This paper evaluates the impact of IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers on the value relevance of financial reports for Australian listed firms. We find that for most firms the impacts of transition were immaterial, however some firms experienced a significant reduction in earnings and/or retained earnings and for these firms the value relevance of earnings was generally lower in the pre-adoption period compared to firms in which there was no material impact. Post adoption, there is little evidence that the standard improved the relevance of earnings generally.     

Do enhanced derivative disclosures work? An informational perspective

Firms use derivatives both for hedging and nonhedging purposes. The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 161 (SFAS 161) requires firms to disclose the purposes of their derivatives usage, thereby helping investors to evaluate the effects of derivatives usage on firm performance. Using a hand-collected sample of US listed firms and a difference-in-differences research design, we find that, compared with nonderivative-users, derivative-users compliant with SFAS 161 experience a significantly greater reduction in stock illiquidity and the probability of informed trading in the post-SFAS 161 period, and such impact is evident only for firms with a high degree of investor attention.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.