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Managerial Discretion and Task Interdependence in Teams

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.     

Choosing the “cargo” for Noah's Ark - Applying Weitzman's approach to Borana cattle in East Africa

If Noah had had the opportunity to select the animals he took on board his Ark, he would have had to choose between many species, breeds and types within breeds, all containing different genetic material. How could he have made the right choice and which would he have taken on board given the constraints he had to face? Those trying to save threatened livestock breeds within a tight conservation budget face similar questions. In this paper we assess how different types of Borana cattle, a culturally significant breed in East Africa, might be prioritized for conservation. By applying a cost-effectiveness analysis on the basis of Weitzman's approach we conclude that the highest priority should be given to the Ethiopian Borana type (EB) in Ethiopia. Noah, however, would also have been concerned about the problems of inbreeding and effective population size. To overcome this problem we suggest that, rather than loading just two animals, he should have loaded on board 1000 female and 100 male animals as a safe minimum. The minimum cost of conserving 1100 animals of the EB type with the participation of Ethiopian communities is calculated to be €7700 per year, mostly in the form of compensation payments to meet the opportunity costs of livestock-keepers that arise when maintaining the EB.     

Model Uncertainty,Political Learning,and Institutions: A Broader View on Mancur Olson's Theory of Institutional Sclerosis

In his Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argues that politically stable countries suffer from declining growth rates caused by the growing influence of distributional coalitions that accumulate over time. The empirical literature supports the notion of a negative relationship between a country's duration of political stability and its growth rates but finds only weak support for a negative influence of distributional coalitions on growth. This paper sketches a simple model of party competition under model uncertainty, which may explain this mixed empirical picture. It shows that politically stable democracies are less well equipped to adjust to shifts in their economic environment than democracies with a shorter history of political stability. In a further step, the paper relates the major theme of this theory and Olson's theory to the more recent literature on institutions and growth. Directions for further research are discussed.     

About handy, handmade and handsome models

Statistical inference deals with natural variation between units and with uncertainty due to sampling, measurement error and random assignment to treatments. Almost always it does so within one model, assumed fixed and valid. Here, however, variation of conclusions due to variation in model choice will be discussed. Heuristics to find appropriate models are seldom taught, and model fit tests and model fit diagnostics are far from optimal. The use of more than one model for the same data is illustrated by examples from Item Response Theory.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S NATIONAL INCOME BY SOCIAL CLASSES IN 1938

This paper presents the results of an investigation of the distribution of Yugoslavia's national income by social classes in 1938. The population in mid-1938 was apportioned among social classes as follows: proletariat 34.6 per cent, middle classes 59.2 per cent, bourgeoisie 5.3 per cent, 0.9 per cent unallocated. About three-quarters of the population was rural. The proletariat amounted to 5.2 million persons, of which 3 million were peasants living on dwarf holdings and 2.2 million were rural and urban wage earners. Unemployment in the non-agricultural sector was 10 per cent; if the agricultural sector is added, overall un- and under-employment amounted to 31 per cent. The bourgeoisie consisted of 0.8 million persons, of which two-fifths were rich peasants. Of the 9 million persons in the middle classes, 7 million were peasants with small and medium holdings. The remainder were mainly minor entrepreneurs in the non-agricultural sector. The proletariat accounted for 35 per cent of total population but only 18 per cent of aggregate income, whereas the bourgeoisie with 5 per cent of the population received 26 per cent of aggregate income. The distribution of income among the various groups of the non-agricultural population was more unequal than among the groups of the agricultural population. Estimates are preesented of the distribution of income by various types and sources, for agricultural and non-agricultural population, together with income per capita, average earnings per employed worker, labor productivity, and capital intensity, the last by industrial branches as well as social classes.     

On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs

This paper explains why seemingly irrational overconfident behavior can persist. Information aggregation is poor in groups in which most individuals herd. By ignoring the herd, the actions of overconfident individuals ("entrepreneurs") convey their private information. However, entrepreneurs make mistakes and thus die more frequently. The socially optimal proportion of entrepreneurs trades off the positive information externality against high attrition rates of entrepreneurs, and depends on the size of the group, on the degree of overconfidence, and on the accuracy of individuals' private information. The stationary distribution trades off the fitness of the group against the fitness of overconfident individuals.