Interactive influence of genre familiarity,star power,and critics' reviews in the cultural goods industry: The case of motion pictures

Academic research pertaining to the marketing of cultural products such as Broadway shows, books, music, and movies has identified a product's genre (or type), star power, and critics' reviews as important factors influencing the market performance of an individual product. Prior research, however, has not investigated the joint influences of these factors. The current study extends previous research by empirically investigating the managerially relevant interactive influences of these factors within the context of the motion‐picture industry. For example, should producers of more familiar genre movies, such as dramas and comedies, feature popular, but expensive, stars? Real‐world data from two distinct time periods are used to test the hypotheses. The findings are consistent across the two time periods and reveal that for more familiar genre movies, star power and the valence of critics' reviews have less impact on the movie's performance in the market. In contrast, for the less familiar genre movies, stronger (vs. weaker) star power and more (vs. less) positive reviews have positive influence on the market performance. Further, for movies with less star power, the valence of critics' reviews has no impact on the performance. In contrast, for movies with greater star power, more (less) positive reviews have positive (negative) influence on movie performance. Managerial and theoretical implications, along with limitations of the findings and directions for future research, are offered. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem

In recent times, judges in the United States have said that6-person juries are inferior to 12-person juries. But by whatreasoning is a smaller jury inferior? One argument is the Condorcetjury theorem, which says that a larger jury will reach a moreaccurate decision. This, however, assumes that the informationof each juror is independent of the size of the jury. I showthat a juror's information does depend on the size of the jury.In a larger jury panel each juror has less incentive to payattention in the court, even though they are all pledged tohear and deliver a verdict on a trial. Because of the free-riderproblem, a larger jury may actually make poorer decisions. Theresults apply to many environments in which decisions are madeby committees and work teams.     

The Babu and the Boxwallah: Managerial Incentives and Government Intervention in a Developing Economy

In developing economies a firm's strategy is directed more often at the government than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions this paper considers a situation where a government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit and the former chooses a tax rate and maximizes tax revenue. The government and the monopoly can delegate the final decision-making to, respectively, a bureaucrat and a manager. The incentive equilibrium of the model is characterized. It is shown that this kind of industrial setting is likely to exhibit greater inefficiencies than that which arises in standard models.     

Oligopsonistic Landlords, Segmented Labor Markets, and the Persistence of Tied-Labor Contracts

This article examines contractual labor arrangements in agrarian economies that persist as a consequence of market power on the part of landlords faced with output uncertainty. We show that a segmented labor market characterized by tied-labor contracts and involuntary unemployment in the lean season are optimal as compared to a labor hiring arrangement that guarantees full employment of labor in both seasons. Government intervention in the form of a specific subsidy targeted toward the hiring of permanent laborers may raise the welfare of all laborers while a specific subsidy directed toward the hiring of casual laborers or the institution of relief programs that absorb the rural unemployed in the lean season leads to the casual laborers in the economy being worse off.     

Are lifecycle funds appropriate as default options in participant-directed retirement plans?

Since the enactment of Pension Protection Act of 2006, lifecycle funds that reduce exposure to stocks with age have rapidly replaced money market funds as the most commonly nominated default investment options for participant-directed retirement plans. We examine their appropriateness in meeting a threshold level of retirement wealth required by plan participants. Using a utility function motivated by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we show that whilst lifecycle funds are vastly superior to money market funds (except for very low thresholds), they rank below balanced funds that maintain constant exposure to equities over time. As thresholds increase, lifecycle funds are also dominated by funds that switch assets conditional to prior investment performance. Even in the absence of a minimum threshold wealth level, lifecycle funds do not emerge as the most preferred choice among the investment options considered by our paper.     

Self-construal and feature centrality

The current research investigates the interactive influence of self-construal and product feature centrality on product judgment tasks. Feature centrality refers to the extent to which a feature is integral to the product concept and its network of correlated features, and contributes to the coherence of the product’s conceptual representation. While the categorization literature suggests that central features (versus less central features) are weighted more when consumers make judgments about a product, across two studies we find such effect is bounded by individuals’ self-construal. In particular, whereas independent consumers, adopting an analytical thinking style, rely more on central features than less central features in product categorization and evaluations, interdependent consumers, employing a holistic thinking style, use both features to form their judgments.     

Cardinal utility, utilitarianism, and a class of invariance axioms in welfare analysis

This paper examines some problems of utility measurement and interpersonal comparisons. The following theorem is first established for real-valued mappings on a set of real numbers, B: If the closure of B is an interval, then such a mapping is positive affine iff it is a first-difference preserving transformation. This theorem is used to axiomatize cardinal utility. Standard invariance axioms in social choice theory are interpreted in an alternative framework and this gives new results in axiomatizing utilitarianism. It is shown that the conflict between utilitarianism and Rawlsianism arises, in some sense, earlier than traditionally supposed.