Stochastic efficiency analysis with risk aversion bounds: a correction

A recent paper by Hardaker et al. (The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 48, 2004a, 253) and book by Hardaker et al. (Coping with Risk in Agriculture, 2004b) describe a procedure for determining an efficient set from among a set of random alternatives. This procedure, called stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF), is claimed to make the same assumption concerning the risk aversion measures as does stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF). This is claim is incorrect. SERF imposes an additional requirement on the risk aversion measures of the decision makers. Both procedures assume a lower and an upper bound on risk aversion, but SERF also assumes that all risk aversion measures are of the same functional form as these lower and upper bound functions. This additional strong requirement on risk preferences implies that the efficient set identified under SERF is usually smaller than that identified using SDRF.     

The logics of budgeting: Theorization and practice variation in the educational field

This paper examines the introduction of budgeting practices in situations where institutional logics are competing. The empirical cases, studied in two phases in the 1990s and in 2011, explore tensions that emerged between the new business logic, prevailing professional logic, and governance logic in the education field. We analyze the theorization of budgeting practices and their performative effect on cognition in organizations. We argue that competing logics in a field impact upon budgeting practices and theorization of the meanings attributed to budgetary outcomes. Our study contributes to the understanding of accounting in processes of institutional change, and the further development of neo-institutionalist theory by attending to the sources of practice variation and their relationship to competing logics. We advance four tentative theoretical propositions concerning the impact of multiple logics upon budgetary practices.     

Supply management in American public administration: Towards an academic discipline?

This article examines the development of supply management in the U.S. to assess its progress towards academic disciplinary status. A comparison of the fields of business administration and public administration indicates that supply management is more developed in the former than in the latter, which inhibits its disciplinary status. Various reasons for this uneven development in the two fields are explored. The paper argues that a paradigm shift must occur for public supply management, which will re-orient it around the concept of the public interest. This will require public supply professionals to participate strategically in public policy-making in order to ascertain and promote the public interest. A policy framework is used to illustrate this re-orientation and to suggest directions for further research.     

Junk bonds,life insurer insolvency,and stock market reactions: The case of first executive corporation

The First Executive Corporation was the largest failure in the history of the life insurance industry. The company was one of the most aggressive purchasers of junk bonds through the 1980s and was the first of several large failures in the staid life insurance industry. In this article, we examine the effect of First Executive's failure on the value of companies in the life insurance industry. We find that the price of other life insurance companies' stock is negatively affected by the earnings announcement that preceded First Executive's failure. The magnitude of an individual company's reaction to First Executive's loss varies according to the proportion of the company's assets invested in junk bonds, the proportion of the company's assests invested in real estate, and the financial strength of the company as measured by A.M. Best's rating.     

Conflicts and complementarities in the objectives of manpower policy: an illustration

The notion that policy-makers may encounter problems of conflict in the simultaneous pursuit of macro-economic objectives has accounted for a sizeable segment of the economics literature in recent years. In the academic context, this conflict has attracted considerable attention, generally in the form of the well-known Phillips-curve relationship. Non-academic opinion has also been reasonably well-informed as evidenced by the apparently widespread understanding of the inflation-unemployment trade-off dilemma.     

Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining

Most game-theoretic models of strategic interaction, indeed most economic models of any sort, specify potential outcomes entirely in terms of the preferences of the agents, as captured in their (possibly cardinal) utility functions. The underlying assumption is that the outcome of such interactions is determined entirely by these preferences, together with the strategic possibilities available to the agents. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the adequacy of this assumption in general, by investigating it in the specific context of two-person bargaining. In particular, we consider whether certain experimental results reported earlier can be accounted for strictly in terms of players' preferences and strategic possibilities, and we report a new experimental study designed to answer this question. The results strongly support the conclusion that sociological factors, unrelated to what we normally consider to be the ‘economic’ parameters of a game, can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining, in a systematic manner.     

A WHEAT POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES*

A study of the origins of the wheat surplus problem in Australia suggests that more far-reaching adjustments in national wheat policy are required than those currently envisaged. Ten specific recommendations for the reform of the present policy are outlined. A new form of income stabilisation scheme is proposed.