REFLECTIONS ON MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS FOR CONSERVATION OF EXMOOR MOORLAND

The impact of grant aid schemes and modern farm technology is considered in relation to the Study of Exmoor carried out by Lord Porchester. The development in the last three years of an administrative system based on voluntary notification using a moorland map, policies for protection of areas of special landscape value and financial guidelines for compensation is described. The conservation objectives behind management agreements are discussed and present practices with examples are illustrated. Future hazards facing successful use of management agreements are discussed with special reference to problems of funding, misuse of the system and the philosophy of progressive farming.     

Automation and manufacturing employment: A reappraisal

Manufacturing unemployment is caused by many kinds of organizational change, often a change to automatic production. A framework is suggested here for analyzing the relationship of automation-change to other organizational changes.     

ARDA AND POVERTY — LESSONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL PLANNING*

Rapid changes in the social and economic environment are creating problems which require new forms of government intervention. This paper explores the reason for this, the needs and the difficulties within our present institutional structure and based on experience to date in implementing the ARDA and FRED legislation, outlines a possible process through which government intervention in these new areas can be made more effective. ARDA ET LA PAUVRETÉ— LEÇONS DANS LA PLANIFICATION ET l'ÉVOLUTION: La rapidité des changements dans le milieu social et économique créent des problèmes qui demandent une nouvelle formule dans l'intervention gouvernementale. Cette dissertation explore les raisons pour cela, les besoins et les difficultés au sein, de notre présente structure et en se baseant sur l'expérience à date dans la législation ARDA et FRED, souligne une méthode possible à trovers lequel, une intervention gouvernementale dans ces nouvelles régions pourrait être plus efficace.     

An investigation of managerial interventions in employee disputes

Seventy four university managers described up to six recent conflicts and reported on their intervention strategies. Findings show that managers use a range of strategies, including overlooking, as interventions for employees’ disputes, instead of favoring the use of any particular one. Choices of intervention strategies were influenced by the type of issue being disputed, the seriousness of the dispute, and managers’ self-efficacy with mediation. Specifically, managers most frequently used mediation to resolve task-related disputes, and tended to use a variety of different strategies to intervene in personality conflicts. When managers perceived conflicts to be highly serious, they most frequently used mediation, followed by arbitration, offering incentives, and lastly, overlooking. Managers with a high degree of mediation self-efficacy more frequently mediated employees’ disputes, whereas managers with a low degree of mediation self-efficacy more frequently overlooked employees’ disputes. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Undesirable competition

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy.     

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

Origins of regional divergence: economic growth in socialist Yugoslavia†

Relative to western Europe, we know very little about the determinants of economic growth at the regional level within socialist Europe. This is somewhat unusual, given that socialist policy-makers have put great emphasis on equitable regional development. This article analyses the regional patterns of growth and divergence in socialist Yugoslavia. New estimates of output and inputs are constructed, and an analysis of output growth, factor accumulation, structural modernization, and productivity is provided. Two novel empirical findings are uncovered. The first is that the sources of growth across the regions were fundamentally different. Total factor productivity was a much more important source of growth in the richer regions than it was in the poorer ones. The second finding is that the source of the regional income divergence lies in the failure of the less developed regions to converge towards the employment rates and total factor productivities of the more developed regions. These failures are interpreted, at least partially, as symptoms of the governing objective and the soft budget constraint of the labour-managed firms that operated in Yugoslavia. It is argued that Yugoslavia's development model was less suited to the pre-conditions that prevailed in the less developed parts of the country.     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.