ON AGENT’S AGREEMENT AND PARTIAL‐EQUILIBRIUM PRICING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS

We consider two risk‐averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers with nontraded random endowments, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for negotiation to be successful, i.e., for the trade to occur. We also study the asymptotic case where the size of the claim is small compared to the random endowments and we give a full characterization in this case. Finally, we study a partial‐equilibrium problem for a bundle of divisible claims and establish existence and uniqueness. A number of technical results on conditional indifference prices is provided.     

Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. In this paper, we propose a game where agents’ strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow–Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents’ best response problems have unique solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation, and it is proved to exist for an arbitrary number of agents and to be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk-tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium than compared to the Arrow–Debreu one.     

Partial equilibria with convex capital requirements: existence,uniqueness and stability

We consider several risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of a bundle of contingent claims in an incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market. Assuming that the agents’ risk preferences are modeled by convex capital requirements, we define and analyze their demand functions and propose a notion of a partial equilibrium price. In addition to sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness, we also show that the equilibrium prices are stable with respect to misspecifications of agents’ risk preferences.     

From monopoly to voice effects? British workplace unionism and productivity performance into the new millennium

Britain has featured prominently in debates about unionism and productivity. This article suggests a recent revolution in the productivity effect of British unionism. A thorough review of extant evidence at various levels of aggregation indicates that whatever the broader cost to employee welfare and well-being, the hollowing and erosion of workplace unionism under Thatcherism delivered a one-off productivity dividend. However, by the turn of the millennium, extant Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) analysis shows that workplace unionism, where it remained, was no longer robustly linked to poorer productivity performance. Our private sector analysis of WERS2011 confirms this, while our analysis of the WERS2004–2011 panel indicates that stronger workplace unionism now positively promotes private sector productivity. A thorough contemplation of the shifting concomitants of modern British unionism suggests a variety of processes which may underlie our striking panel findings, underscoring the suggestion that there has been a revolution in British unionism's productivity implications, but also indicating mechanisms which may underlie positive productivity effects of joint regulation already apparent in other countries.     

Effective risk aversion in thin risk‐sharing markets

We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to the market portfolio tend to behave in a more risk tolerant manner. Noncompetitive equilibrium prices and allocations result as an outcome of a game among traders. General sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium are provided, with extensive analysis of two‐trader transactions. Even though strategic behavior causes inefficient social allocations, traders with sufficiently high risk tolerance and/or high initial exposure to tradable securities obtain more utility gain in the noncompetitive equilibrium, when compared to the competitive one.     

EXAMINING THE STABILITY OF OKUN'S COEFFICIENT

The stability of Okun's law coefficient in the United States from 1949 to 2015 is examined using a regression with GARCH errors in order to capture the volatility of the series. Rolling estimations suggest that taking the volatility of the series into account yields more stable results compared to the simple OLS estimation, irrespective of the specification (gap or growth model), the data frequency (monthly or quarterly), or the length of the rolling window. The results also suggest that the persistence of shocks became much more important in explaining contemporaneous volatility when data from the recent global financial crisis were incorporated. In contrast, the feedthrough of output shocks in next period's output volatility was more important in the past, and especially during the 1970s stagflation period, but has been declining since.     

Risk and Structural Instability in US House Prices

This paper employs a Component GARCH in Mean model to show that house prices across a number of major US cities between 1987 and 2009 have displayed asset market properties in terms of both risk-return relationships and asymmetric adjustment to shocks. In addition, tests for structural breaks in the mean and variance indicate structural instability across the data range. Multiple breaks are identified across all cities, particularly for the early 1990s and during the post-2007 financial crisis as housing has become an increasingly risky asset. Estimating the models over the individual sub-samples suggests that over the last 20 years the financial sector has increasingly failed to account for the levels of risk associated with real estate markets. This result has possible implications for the way in which financial institutions should be regulated in the future.     

More than Just an Opinion: The Effect of Verbal Self‐Expression on Consumer Choice

In an ever‐widening range of occasions, consumers have the opportunity to comment and express their opinions on brands and products. However, little is known about how voicing opinions about the choice options before actually choosing might affect consumer choice, and specifically liking of choice. This paper proposes that pre‐choice opinion expression undermines the effect of post‐choice bolstering, because opinion sufficiently satisfies self‐expressive needs and therefore supersedes the use of subsequent choice as a self‐expressive resource. This proposition is based on the assumption that opinion can psychologically substitute for choice, because the two represent alternative routes to self‐expression. Two experiments provide empirical support for this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that after articulating their opinions about the choice options, participants were less likely to idealize their choices, and this effect was mediated by a change in the construal of choice as self‐expression. Study 2 further showed that this effect is moderated by public versus private occasions of opinion voicing and by individual differences in the value of expression. Together, findings support that opinion is enough to express the self, and if such an opportunity is made available prior to choosing, consumers’ liking of their choices is weakened.     

Absence management of migrant agency workers in the food manufacturing sector

Temporary workers in low-skilled roles often experience ‘hard’ HRM practices, for example the use of the Bradford Factor to monitor absence, rather than using incentives to reward attendance. However, this peripheral workforce has become increasingly diverse in the UK since the A8 European Union expansion, which has seen over a million migrants from central and eastern Europe register to work in the UK. Importantly, there is also heterogeneity within this group of workers, for example between those who intend to migrate for a short period of time then return, and those who are more settled and wish to develop a career. By considering the particular case of absence management, this paper examines how these different groups of migrants respond to HRM practices. The key contribution of the paper is to examine how different groups of migrants experience these practices, rather than simply comparing migrant and native workers as two homogeneous groups. The paper presents data from the food manufacturing sector in the UK. In total, 88 semi-structured interviews were conducted with operations managers, HR managers, union convenors and workers on permanent, temporary and agency contracts. In addition, data from informal interviews and observation at five companies are presented.