Sovereign wealth funds,productivity and people: The impact of Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global investments in the United Kingdom

Sovereign wealth funds have an increasing presence in the global financial ecosystem, principally through their investments in equities, which, in turn, may influence HRM. This study examines the influence of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global (NGPF‐G), on employment in its U.K. investee firms. We find that firms with NGPF‐G investment are significantly less likely to reduce their demand for labour, more specifically in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. When a drop in the demand for labour does occur, it is less extreme when compared to similar organisations without a NGPF‐G shareholding, and this is evident even in the case of relatively small NGPF‐G investments. These findings are in line with the fund's objective of promoting corporate sustainability and Norwegian values. We draw out the key implications of our findings for HR practice.     

The developer's problem, or how to divide a piece of land most profitably

How a developer chooses to subdivide his landholding depends on the distribution of potential buyers and their maximum offers for different sized plots. These offers depend, inter alia, upon factors outside the developer's control such as community tax rates and public services. The developer's optimal subdivision scheme for a continuum of buyers is derived, together with the implied prices of land on different sized plots. We also illustrate the effect of alternative tax regimes on the profit-maximizing density of development, when the landholding is subdivided into equal-sized plots, and exhibit the conflict of interest between developers and existing community residents.     

Market pioneers, late movers, and the resource-based view (RBV): A conceptual model

Lieberman and Montgomery note that “…we see benefits from linking empirical findings on first-mover advantages with the complementary stream of research on the resource-based view of the firm” (1998, p. 1111); they suggest that such a link will help explain differences in firm performance. Therefore, this study develops a conceptual framework linking FMAs with the resource-based view of the firm (RBV); in doing so, this framework explains the links between entry timing, resource management, and firm performance. Specifically, this study examines FMAs in light of a four-step resource management process [Morgan RM. Relationship marketing and marketing strategy: the evolution of relationship strategy within the organization. In: Sheth JN, Parvatiyar A, editors. Handbook of Relationship Marketing. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2000. p. 481–504.; Morgan RM, Hunt S. Relationship-based competitive advantage: the role of relationship marketing in marketing strategy. J Bus Res 1999; 46 (November): 281–90.] consisting of: 1) efficient acquisition (EA), 2) bundling/combining (BC), 3) positioning (POS), and 4) maintenance/protection (MP). The link between FMAs and the resource management process helps explain why so few first movers retain their advantages.     

The integration of forecasting and strategic planning

The paper analyzes the use of information in companies planning strategically versus those which are not. This contrast is used to build the case for developing strategic forecasting capability which focuses on a variety of environments, is proactive and interactive, and creates a need for different kinds of data bases and forecasting techniques.     

Has Devolution Increased Democratic Accountability?

This article examines the impact of devolution, the New Public Management and public management culture on accounting for democratic accountability in the first term of the devolved national assemblies and parliament in the UK. Although there is more openness, transparency, consultation and scrutiny with regard to budgets, accounts and performance as a result of devolution, there is extensive information overload. Thus, many politicians are highly dependent on the parliamentary division of labour and are reliant on experts and advisors functioning as buffers and filters of accounting information.