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101.
Wilhelm Weber 《Journal of Economics》1954,14(2-4):487-535
102.
In this paper, we explore bidders' incentives to gather information in auctions, when there is one bidder with only public information and another with some private information. We find that the bidder with only public information makes no profit at equilibrium, while the bidder with private information generally makes positive profits. Moreover, the informed bidder's profits rise when he gathers extra information, and the increase in greater when the information is collected overtly than when it is collected covertly. When the uniformed bidder can observe some of the better-informed bidder's information, he prefers to make his observations covertly. If the seller has access to some of the better-informed bidder's information, or if he has affiliated information of his own, he can raise the expected price by adopting a policy of making that information public. However, there are cases where a policy of publicizing his information would lower the expected price. The distinguishing feature of these latter cases seems to be that the seller's information is complementary to the information of the better-informed bidder. 相似文献
103.
G. Giorgi E. Küng E. Ch. Mosing K. W. Rothschild J. Rieder K. H. Werner G. Scholz H. Bayer H. Moeller W. Weber F. Klezl G. Marktl A. M. Knoll A. Montaner F. Ermacora 《Journal of Economics》1956,16(3-4):461-480
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
104.
Adolf Weber 《Review of World Economics》1973,109(2):A74-A75
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
105.
Wilhelm Weber 《Journal of Economics》1958,17(4):389-392
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
106.
Wilhelm Weber 《Journal of Economics》1963,23(1-2):218-228
107.
F. Klezl K. W. Rothschild W. Froehlich H. Moeller G. Bruckmann K. H. Werner A. Klamecker R. Richter G. Riemschneider G. Tintner J. Krywult G. Marktl E. Reichard H. Arndt A. Burghardt R. Nieschlag W. Weber D. Kalussis E. Kosiol L. Mayer C. Zimmerer 《Journal of Economics》1957,17(2-3):349-388
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
108.
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
109.
Olaf Helmer 《Technological Forecasting and Social Change》1975,7(1):107-109
110.
Empirical research about tax evasion and the informal economy has exploded in the past few decades, seeking to shed light
on the magnitude and (especially policy) determinants of these phenomena. Quantitative information informs the analysis of
policy choices, enables the testing of hypotheses about determinants of this phenomenon, and can help with the accurate construction
of national income accounts. Even as empirical analysis has burgeoned, some have expressed doubts about the quality and usefulness
of some prominent measures. The fact that high-quality data is elusive is neither surprising nor a coincidence. The defining
characteristic of tax evasion and informal economic activity—that they are generally illegal—often renders unreliable standard
data collection methods such as surveys. Unlike invisible phenomena in the natural sciences, these invisible social science
phenomena are hard to measure because of choices made by individuals. Analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy must
proceed even in the absence of the direct observability of key variables, and theory should guide the construction and interpretation
of evidence of the “invisible.” In this paper, we address what can be learned using micro or macro data regarding tax evasion
and the informal economy under given conditions and assumptions, and critically review some of the most common empirical methods
in light of our conclusions. We conclude with an entreaty for researchers in this field to enlist in the “credibility revolution”
(Angrist and Pischke in J. Econ. Perspect. 4(2):3–30, 2010) in applied econometrics. 相似文献