Moonlighting politicians

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. At the same time, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in terms of voting attendance.     

国外生态社区能源及技术开发对我国的启示

生态社区是一种兴起于西方国家的,以构建人与自然的平衡关系为目的的聚居单元。其在社会、文化及环境等各方面的努力,使其成为构建理想人居的重要模式,对其研究将有益于我国和谐居住区的建设。本文通过对国外生态社区成功案例的研究,深入分析了生态社区在开发可再生能源、运用生态技术方面的先进经验,并探究其成功经验在我国实施的可行性和必要性。     

Minimum income in a transition economy

The Albanian Ndihma Ekonomike is one of the first poverty reduction programmes launched in transitional economies. Its record has been judged positively during the recession period of the 1990s and negatively during the more recent growth phase. This article reconsiders the programme using a regression‐adjusted local linear matching estimator first suggested by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). We find the programme to have a weak targeting capacity and a non‐significant impact on different household outcomes.     

The returns to formality and informality in urban Africa

This paper addresses the questions as to the size and causes of earnings differentials in two urban African labor markets, those of Ghana and Tanzania. We have panel data so we can ask how far time invariant unobservables, market ability for short, matters in the determination of earnings. We also have information on whether the individual is own self-employed, self-employed with employees, a private or public sector wage employee and the size of the enterprise in which wage employees work or which the self-employed owns. We find, mirroring work on developed economies, that unobserved individual market ability is by far the most important factor explaining the variance of earnings. With controls for such ability the gap between private wage employment and civil servants is about 50%. With controls for enterprise size we find that wage employees earn the same as the self-employed in both Ghana and Tanzania. Enterprise size matters. At most half of the OLS effect of size on earnings can be explained by unobservable ability. Workers in the largest firms are the high earners with wage rates which exceed those of civil servants. These results all assume exogenous movement. We find evidence that endogeneity bias may be serious and may be understating the extent of both the size effect and the private sector wage (negative) premium. The implications of our results for understanding the nature of formal and informal employment in Africa are discussed.     

The co-evolution of innovation,demand and growth

In order to explain long-run economic development, we analyse in this paper the interplay between supply-side and demand-side processes. On the supply side, three different innovation processes are observed and interact: (i) growing productive efficiency, (ii) the emergence of new sectors and (iii) the increasing quality and differentiation of existing products. On the demand side, we analyse the meaning of disposable income and varying preference systems. The analysis is undertaken with the help of a numerical model of economic growth by the emergence of new industries. Our results show that the time path of economic development which we observe could not have been generated by taking into account a supply-side-based view on innovations alone. Without making reference to the formation of an adequate demand, development processes cannot be explained. The three processes need to be combined because each one individually would not suffice to generate long-run economic development. However, only with the formation of an adequate demand long-run economic development becomes sustainable.     

HEALTH IMPROVEMENTS AND THE TRANSITION OUT OF MALTHUSIAN STAGNATION

The central component of most economic models that analyse the transition from the Malthusian regime to self-sustaining developed economies is education. Improved health is normally envisaged as simply a by-product of economic growth. Whereas growth does, indeed, tend to improve health status, the reverse is also true, namely that health improvements are a dynamic force capable of driving economic expansion. This paper underlines the importance of health improvements in escaping from Malthusian stagnation. Further, and in contrast to existing literature, which emphasizes the effects of changes in mortality rates, this paper focuses on the relationship between health status and the efficiency of human capital technology. Through this channel, health improvements stimulate investments in child quality in terms of both nourishing and schooling and drive the economy towards the Modern Growth regime.     

RELAXED UTILITY MAXIMIZATION IN COMPLETE MARKETS

For a relaxed investor—one whose relative risk aversion vanishes as wealth becomes large—the utility maximization problem may not have a solution in the classical sense of an optimal payoff represented by a random variable. This nonexistence puzzle was discovered by Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) , who introduced the reasonable asymptotic elasticity condition to exclude such situations. Utility maximization becomes well posed again representing payoffs as measures on the sample space, including those allocations singular with respect to the physical probability. The expected utility of such allocations is understood as the maximal utility of its approximations with classical payoffs—the relaxed expected utility. This paper decomposes relaxed expected utility into its classical and singular parts, represents the singular part in integral form, and proves the existence of optimal solutions for the utility maximization problem, without conditions on the asymptotic elasticity. Key to this result is the Polish space structure assumed on the sample space.