Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.     

Fractional Integration of Nominal Exchange Rates: Evidence from CEECs in the Light of EMU Enlargement

This paper uses fractional integration models to describe the long‐run dependence of nominal exchange rates in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The analysis is validated using nonparametric, semiparametric and parametric techniques. From comparing the results across the three approaches, it was clear that mean reversion takes places only for the euro exchange rates in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovenia. Other exchange rates based on the euro also display mean reversion with the parametric methods. For the US dollar rates, the unit‐root null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any single country, indicating that shocks affecting the exchange rates against the US dollar are of a permanent nature, while those directed against the euro are less persistent, and tend sometimes to disappear in the long run. Policy implications are derived.     

Uncovered Interest Parity: Cross‐Sectional Evidence

Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is estimated for short‐term horizons from one month to 12 months using a large number of cross‐sectional bilateral exchange rates. In contrast to conventional time‐series UIP, cross‐sectional UIP is examined with a single‐equation estimation and panel regression model estimation. The exchange rates analyzed here include a broad spectrum of countries: developed, developing, low‐inflation, and high‐inflation countries. Based on the empirical evidence, there does not appear to be a well‐publicized UIP puzzle for cross‐sectional UIP, and the slope estimates remain largely between zero and one throughout the sample periods, with a few exceptions. Evidence of UIP is more clear for low inflation countries than for high inflation countries. As interest rate maturity becomes longer from one month to 12 months, the UIP relationship becomes weaker.     

QUALITY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A SEMIPARAMETRIC SMOOTH COEFFICIENT ESTIMATION

This paper proposes a semiparametric smooth coefficient cost model to study the university cost structure where coefficients are an unknown function of the university's overall quality. A local least square method with a kernel weight function is used to estimate the cost function, and a simple statistic for testing a parametric model of the additive quality versus the semiparametric smooth coefficient model is applied. Empirical results from 56 universities in Taiwan show that, taking quality into account, higher education is subject to diseconomies of scale. In all categories—comprehensive and science/technology and public and private universities—the current university scale in Taiwan is too big to be cost efficient. (JEL I21, H52, 9120)     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

Nonlinearity between Trade Openness and Economic Development

This paper utilizes the instrumental variable threshold regressions approach to reassess the trade–development link. It finds evidence that trade openness contributes to uneven development. Greater trade openness tends to have beneficial effects on real development of high‐income countries. For low‐income ones, however, trade openness appears to influence real income in a significant and negative way. The data also reveal that greater trade openness has a positive effect on capital accumulation, productivity growth, and financial development in high‐income countries, but a negative impact in low‐income ones.     

Banking Sector Performance in Latin America: Market Power versus Efficiency

Since the mid‐1990s the banking sector in the Latin American emerging markets has experienced profound changes due to financial liberalization, a significant increase in foreign investments, and greater merger activities often occurring following financial crises. The wave of consolidation and the rapid increase in market concentration that took place in most countries has generated concerns about the rise in banks' market power and its potential effects on consumers. This paper advances the existing literature by testing the market power (Structure–Conduct–Performance and Relative Market Power) and efficient structure (X‐ and scale efficiency) hypotheses for a sample of over 2500 bank observations in nine Latin American countries over 1997–2005. We use the Data Envelopment Analysis technique to obtain reliable efficiency measures. We produce evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses. The findings are particularly robust for the largest banking markets in the region, namely Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Finally, capital ratios and bank size seem to be among the most important factors in explaining higher than normal profits for Latin American banks.     

TEST OF THE CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS ALLOWING FOR CROSS‐SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE

A large empirical literature has investigated whether per capita output converges around a common trend across national and regional economies. The methods used in this literature assume no cross‐sectional dependence even though it is likely to be present and might be important in practice. Chang has devised a promising method of testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross‐sectional dependence. We apply her method to test whether convergence takes place across three samples of economies: 15 advanced industrial countries; a broader group of 57 countries; and the 48 contiguous US states. We find evidence of convergence for the 15 advanced industrial economies but no evidence of convergence across either the broad group of countries or the US states.     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

Trade‐led growth hypothesis in Cuban commercial regimes since 19601,2

This study examines the impact of trade on Cuban growth during different commercial policy regimes spanning the period from 1960 up to 2004, encompassing two essential economic structural transformations: the Cuban revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall. For this purpose, the Granger causality is used by means of the modified Wald test for augmented‐level vector autoregressive model with integrated and cointegrated processes introduced by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lutekepohl (1996) . We show an import‐led growth hypothesis during the Soviet‐oriented pattern that is rejected after 1990, when exports are not only responsive to growth expansion but also to imports’ behaviour.