Hedging,Financing and Investment Decisions: A Simultaneous Equations Framework

We empirically investigate the interactions among hedging, financing, and investment decisions. We argue that the way in which hedging affects a firm's financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth opportunities. We find that high growth firms increase their investment, but not leverage, by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase their leverage.     

Separating microstructure noise from volatility

There are two variance components embedded in the returns constructed using high frequency asset prices: the time-varying variance of the unobservable efficient returns that would prevail in a frictionless economy and the variance of the equally unobservable microstructure noise. Using sample moments of high frequency return data recorded at different frequencies, we provide a simple and robust technique to identify both variance components.     

The Quality of Smallholder Coffee in South Sumatra: The Production of Low-Quality Coffee as a Response to World Demand 1

Improving the quality of Indonesia's coffee exports has been a priority of government and the Association of Indonesian Coffee Exporters for some years. Efforts to achieve this objective have, however, been hampered by misconceptions about the reasons why coffee producers and traders at each point in the marketing network do not deliver a higher quality product. The research reported here shows that price premia for higher quality coffee are not large enough to encourage greater quality enhancement. The world market for low to medium grades, used in the production of instant coffee, is much larger than that for high-quality coffee, and this preference is transmitted in the form of low incentives to improve the product. Failure to understand this has led to government policies which at best do not solve the quality problem and at worst exacerbate it.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

The FRC AND Accounting Standard‐Setting: Should I Still Call Australia Home?

This paper analyses the decision of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to replace Australian accounting standards with international accounting standards on 1 January, 2005. Two main topics are considered: the appropriateness of the FRC's directive, and the case against the proposed adoption date. We argue that the FRC has not conducted sufficient consultation with affected parties and that the hasty implementation will impose costs that could have been avoided with the exercise of more caution.     

Executives’ Orientations as Indicators of Crisis Management Policies and Practices*

ABSTRACT The paper examines effects of executives’ orientations on crisis management awareness and practices, drawing on the simplicity and paradox management theories. It is suggested that a focus on single‐sided management constitutes an antecedent of crisis proneness. Employing a set of key corporate domains and based on a holistic organizational approach, the study aims at assessing the extent to which companies are crisis prone or prepared. In a sample of 82 Istaeli business and not‐for‐profit organizations it was found that human resource management, strategy, structure, and unlearning factors significantly predicted crisis preparedness. These results suggest that unlearning, despite a mere allusion to this correlate in the simplicity and paradox management theories, correlates better with crisis preparedness. By contrast, traditional strategy‐related and structural effects were marginally related to crisis management policies. Implications and suggestions for further research are proposed.     

Making Financial Goals and Reporting Policies Serve

The main. nancial goal of Progressive Insurance, the third largest underwriter of auto insurance in the U.S., has remained the same since the late 1960s. Expressed in three words, "96 and grow," the goal tells the company's managers to pursue all growth opportunities while maintaining a "combined ratio" no higher than 96, or what amounts to a minimum 4% spread between revenues (premiums) and costs (including expected losses). Thanks in part to the clarity of mission provided by this goal, the company has produced an average 15% rate of growth in revenues and earnings, along with a remarkably stable 15% return for its shareholders, since going public in 1971.
Progressive's simplicity and clarity of mission is also partly responsible for another of the company's distinctive policies: product pricing that, while disciplined, is aggressive and highly decentralized. Having invested some $500 million per year developing statistical models for pricing individual customer risks and acquisition costs, the company was among the. rst in its industry to underwrite "non-standard" risks. And aided by sophisticated pricing models, each of Progressive's 100 or so local product managers are charged with adapting those models to come up with premiums for their own regions.
To go along with its strategic and organizational innovations, Progressive also has an innovative disclosure policy. Apart from SEC reports, the company's communications seldom mention earnings or earnings per share, and the company has never provided earnings guidance. With the passage of Reg. FD in late 2000, the company brie. y considered offering guidance. But in the spring of 2001, the board decided instead to provide monthly releases of its realized combined ratio. Since adoption of this new disclosure policy, Progressive has seen a 50% drop in the volatility of its stock price.     

CREDIT CYCLES REDUX*

Theoretical studies have shown that under unorthodox assumptions on preferences and production technologies, collateral constraints can act as a powerful amplification and propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks. We investigate whether or not this result holds under more standard assumptions. We find that collateral constraints typically generate small output amplification. Large amplification is obtained as a “knife‐edge” type of result.     

A theoretical framework to evaluate different margin‐setting methodologies

The margin system is the first line of defense against the default risk of a clearinghouse. From the perspectives of a clearinghouse, the utmost concern is to have a prudential system to control the default exposure. Once the level of prudentiality is set, the next concern will be the opportunity cost of the investors, because high opportunity cost discourages people from hedging futures, and thus defeats the function of a futures market. In this article, we first develop different measures of prudentiality and opportunity cost. We then formulate a statistical framework to evaluate different margin‐setting methodologies, all of which strike a balance between prudentiality and opportunity cost. Three margin‐setting methodologies, namely, (1) using simple moving averages; (2) using exponentially weighted moving averages; (3) using a GARCH approach, are applied to the Hang Seng Index futures. Keeping the same prudentiality level, it is shown that the one using a GARCH approach by and large gives the lowest average overcharge. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:117–145, 2004