Combat,casualties, and compensation: Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan

Our research examines the effect of combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan on casualties and combat exposure compensation policy. We use restricted data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Social Security Administration (SSA) to construct a panel of all US Active Duty service members having served at some point during the years 2001–2012. Casualties disproportionately occur at higher rates among (i) young, white, males, (ii) enlisted personnel, (iii) less educated personnel, and (iv) those in combat job types. Our estimates indicate that overall US military personnel who deployed in an individual year to Iraq or Afghanistan had a 45 per 100,000 higher probability of death than non-deployed military personnel who remained stateside. The increased fatal injury risk of deployed US military personnel is 15 times higher than the national average civilian workplace fatality rate, but roughly equal to the fatal injury risk faced in some of the most dangerous civilian occupations. Our estimates suggest a compensating wage differential equal to $861 per month would be appropriate in comparison to the current average of $1238 per month in danger pay provided to US military personnel deployed into combat zones. We recommend a revenue-neutral approach in adjusting the pay structure for military members. For example, the military should consider increasing bonuses or base pay while simultaneously decreasing danger pay by an equivalent amount. Furthermore, it may be beneficial to adjust danger pay by service or job type to reflect fatality risk more accurately.     

Decomposing coordination failure in stag hunt games

Experimental Economics - Many situations involve trading-off what is safe for the individual and what is beneficial for the group. This tension is extensively studied as the “Stag Hunt”...     

The organization of volunteer battalions in Ukraine

When war broke out in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the government of Ukraine failed to provide adequate defense to maintain its territorial integrity. In the wake of this government failure, several private volunteer efforts arose to meet popular demand for military action against Russian-backed Separatists. These volunteer battalions had to find alternative methods of aligning their incentives with the population wishing to be defended, and alternative methods of aligning the incentives of their leadership and their recruits. The success of these battalions depended on the potential for political careers and favors, the strength of reputation mechanisms in small communities, and the potential for loot and spoils. These factors shaped the size, characteristics, and activities of the volunteer battalions.