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141.
We analyze under what conditions a group of potential entrepreneurs prefer to form a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), or a mutual‐guarantee association, which we interpret in a rotating scheme and call Rotating Savings and Collateral Association (ROSCoA). We argue that: (1) ROSCAs (ROSCoAs) are likely to be more developed in countries with high (low) bank concentration; (2) the individual flow of savings required to participate in a ROSCoA is generally lower than that needed in a ROSCA; (3) under the assumption that members share their project income at the end of each period, ROSCAs and ROsCoAs are sustainable even without the use of sanctioning mechanisms. 相似文献
142.
Michele Bisceglia Jorge Padilla Joe Perkins Salvatore Piccolo 《The Journal of industrial economics》2024,72(1):516-547
In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non-monotone and features an inverted U-shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation-for-buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy. 相似文献
143.
We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the United States. We find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter-end. We also show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium. 相似文献
144.
145.
Studying a relatively under-researched aspect in economics, this paper examines the nexus between corruption and academic freedom. Our main hypothesis is that greater corruption undermines academic freedom and we test this hypothesis using data for 104 nations from 2012 to 2018. Our results support the main hypothesis, and this finding also generally holds across alternative aspects of academic freedom. Another contribution of this work lies in dissecting the direct and indirect (through corruption) effects of various drivers of academic freedom. Finally, additional insights are gained by considering different dimensions of academic freedom and how they are impacted by corruption. 相似文献
146.
We introduce a model of group behavior that combines expressive participation with strategic participation. Building on the idea that expressive voting in elections is much like rooting for a sports team, we give applications to both sporting events and elections. In our model there is an expressive externality: an individual enjoys an event more when more of her peers come out to support her preferred party or team. We show that this results in the possibility of “tipping”—that participation may jump up discontinuously when the externality becomes strong enough. We examine the implications for pricing by sports teams and for voter turnout. 相似文献
147.
Altunbaş Yener Polizzi Salvatore Scannella Enzo Thornton John 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2022,58(2):649-683
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk... 相似文献
148.
149.
Enrique Andreu Damien Neven Salvatore Piccolo Roberto Venturini 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2023,32(4):788-810
We characterize the degree of price authority that competing upstream principals award their downstream agents in a setting where these agents own private information about demand and incur nonverifiable distribution costs. Principals cannot internalize these costs through monetary incentives and design “permission sets” from which agents choose prices. The objective is to understand the forces shaping delegation and the constraints imposed on equilibrium prices. When principals behave noncooperatively, agents are biased toward excessively high prices because they pass on distribution costs to consumers. Hence, the permission set only features a price cap that is more likely to bind as products become closer substitutes, in sectors where distribution is sufficiently costly, and when demand is not too volatile. By contrast, when principals behave cooperatively, the optimal delegation scheme is richer and more complex. Because principals want to charge the monopoly price, the optimal permission set features a price floor when the distribution cost is sufficiently low, it features instead full discretion for moderate values of this cost, and only when it is high enough, a price cap is optimal. Surprisingly, while competition (as captured by stronger product substitutability) hinders delegation in the noncooperative regime, the opposite occurs when principals maximize industry profit. 相似文献