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71.
72.
This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups. 相似文献
73.
In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on ${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$ and ${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear. 相似文献
74.
In this paper we consider the problem of inducing an ordering over the set of all non-empty subsets of a finite set X of alternatives, given an ordering R over X. Assuming R to be antisymmetric and X to have at least six elements, we provide a set of independent, necessary, and sufficient conditions for the induced ordering to be “median-based” (so that every non-empty subset of X is “indifferent” to its own median set defined in terms of R). 相似文献
75.
A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44. 相似文献
76.
Approval voting reconsidered 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. The merit of approval voting has been widely discussed in the past 25 years. The distinct property of this rule is the extent of flexibility it allows; any voter can approve as many alternatives/candidates as he wishes. Nevertheless, this advantage is the very reason for two drawbacks of approval voting: its extreme vulnerability to majority decisiveness (Theorem 1) and its extreme vulnerability to erosion of the majority principle (Theorem 2). On the one hand, under some feasible voting strategies any majority of more than 1/2 of the voters can guarantee the selection of its most favorable candidate, regardless of the preferences of the other voters. On the other hand, under alternative voting strategies even the largest majority cannot impose its common most preferred candidate. A simultaneous resolution of the two problems is possible by restricted approval voting (RAV), a voting rule that allows partial voter flexibility by restricting the minimal and maximal number of candidates that can be approved. Our main result (Theorem 3) clarifies how the foregone flexibility in voters sovereignty mitigates the above mentioned drawbacks under sincere and insincere coordinated voting. Our findings suggest a new possible justification of a particular voting rule which is based on the significance assigned to three considerations: the advantages of voters flexibility, immunity to majority decisiveness and immunity to erosion of the majority principle. Such justification can provide a possible explanation to the prevalent use of some special cases of RAV, notably, of the plurality rule and of approval voting.Received: 8 October 2003, Revised: 17 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D71, D72.
Correspondence to: Shmuel NitzanWe are indebted to Steve Brams, Remzi Sanver and an anonymous referee for their very useful comments and suggestions. 相似文献
77.
Rational Buyer Meets Rational Seller: Reserves Market Equilibria under Alternative Auction Designs 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We examine efficiency properties and incentive compatibility of alternative auction formats that an electricity network system operator may use for the procurement of ancillary services required for real-time operations. We model the procurement auction as a hierarchical multiproduct auction, and study several designs such as a uniform price auction minimizing revealed social cost, a uniform price auction minimizing the system operator's cost and a pay as bid auction minimizing revealed social cost. We take into account that rational bidders will respond to any market design so as to maximize their expected benefit from participating in that market. Under the assumptions of our model, we show that the uniform price auction minimizing revealed social cost is the only one that guarantees productive efficiency. We also find that expected revenue (payment in our case) equivalence between pay as bid and uniform price auctions does not extend to the hierarchical products case and the ranking of these auctions is ambiguous and depends on the data. For the procurement auction minimizing the system operator's cost, we show that misrepresentation of capability may result in capacity shortages if there are capacity constraints. For the case where only higher capability resources are constrained, this will result in random price spikes decreasing in frequency with the price cap (this is the amount paid to capacity in demand states with shortages). When lower type resources are capacity constrained as well, price spikes will be seen for both type of resources. Such artificial shortages result in reduced reliability in real-time operations. 相似文献
78.
Traditional methods of evaluating transmission expansions focus on the social impact of the investments based on the current
generation stock which may include firm generation expansion plans. In this paper, we evaluate the social welfare implications
of transmission investments based on equilibrium models characterizing the competitive interaction among generation firms
whose decisions in generation capacity investments and production are affected by both the transmission investments and the
congestion management protocols of the transmission system operator. Our analysis shows that both the magnitude of the welfare
gains associated with transmission investments and the location of the best transmission expansions may change when the generation
expansion response is taken into consideration. We illustrate our results using a 30-bus network example.
An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
79.
A group taking part in a contest has to confront the collective action problem among its members, and devices of selective incentives are possible means of resolution. We argue that heterogeneous prize‐valuations in a competing group normally prevent effective use of such selective incentives. To substantiate this claim, we adopt cost‐sharing as a means of incentivizing the individual group members. We confirm that homogeneous prize valuations within a group result in a cost‐sharing rule inducing the first‐best individual contributions. As long as the cost‐sharing rule is dependent only on the members’ contributions, however, such a first‐best rule does not exist for a group with intragroup heterogeneity. Our main result clarifies how unequal prize valuations affect the cost‐sharing rule and, in particular, the degree of cost‐sharing. If the relative rate of change of the marginal effort costs is decreasing, it is reduced by intragroup heterogeneity. If the rate is increasing, the cost is fully shared, but it cannot induce the first‐best contributions for the group. 相似文献
80.
Organizational reforms stimulating democratic decision-making play a role in the economic effectiveness of concessional debt and debt relief. Effectiveness is defined as the increase in project approval produced by debt assistance. This claim is supported by a theoretic model illustrating the role of democratic decision-making in increasing lending as well as in determining the effectiveness of debt assistance. Using the framework of group decision-making in a fixed-size committee, we suggest a novel explanation to the advantage of conditioning debt assistance on organizational reforms that target the decision-making structure in organizations. The results imply that if the aid organization can affect the level of democratization in organizations, it can exploit its advantage and set the debt assistance that induces the maximal increase in project approval. We derive conditions under which organizational reforms that impose various forms of democratic norms in decision-making are important for increasing the effectiveness of debt assistance. We also point to the case where replacing an autocratic decision maker can cause debt assistance effectiveness to decline. 相似文献