Trucking deregulation and highway safety: The effect of the 1980 Motor Carrier Act

The relationship between deregulation in the trucking industry and highway safety is an important economic and social issue. Analyses thus far have concentrated on the relationship between the downward pressure imposed on freight rates by deregulation and total safety investment by firms. Two issues which have been ignored are the effects that deregulation had on route carriage restrictions and total firm mileage. We show that the inclusion of these factors yields a model in which the relationship between motor carrier deregulation and highway safety is dependent upon the relative effects of all three factors. Estimation of the model using accident data implies that trucking deregulation did not deteriorate highway safety and may have actually improved it.     

Promise and peril in implementing pay‐for‐performance

Why would managers abandon pay‐for‐performance plans they initiated with great hopes? Why would employees celebrate this decision? This article explores why managers made their decisions in 12 of 13 pay‐for‐performance “experiments” at Hewlett‐Packard in the mid‐1990s. We find that managers thought the costs of these programs to be higher than the benefits. Alternative managerial practices such as effective leadership, clear objectives, coaching, or training were thought a better investment. Despite the undisputed instrumentality of pay‐for‐performance to motivate, little attention has been given to whether the benefits outweigh the costs or the “fit” of these programs with high‐commitment cultures like Hewlett‐Packard was at the time. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The business cycle with nominal contracts

Summary In this paper we study the quantitative implications of nominal wage contracts for business cycle fluctuations. We address this issue using a model economy based on the neoclassical growth model supplemented by the assumption that cash is needed to purchase goods. We consider a variation of the standard recursive competitive equilibrium concept that is intended to capture the important features of wage contracting. We use this equilibrium construct to address three issues. First, we consider whether monetary shocks, propagated by nominal contracts, constitute a viable alternative to technology shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations. Our results suggest that, while monetary shocks and nominal rigidities succeed in causing output volatility of the required magnitude, the resulting data have properties that are inconsistent with several key features of U.S. data. Second, we consider how the behavior of the economy varies with contract length. We find that the volatility induced by both monetary and technology shocks increases sharply with contract length. Finally we consider how much rigidity would be necessary to match the volatility of U.S. output. We find that only a very small amount of rigidity would be necessary to cause output volatility of the magnitude observed.We have received helpful comments from David Chapman, Paul Gomme, Jeremy Greenwood, Gary Hansen, Michael Keane, Tim Kehoe, Lee Ohanian, Edward Prescott, and Warren Weber. The usual disclaimer applies. This research is supported in part by NSF Grant SES-8921346 and the John M. Olin Foundation.     

Announced layoffs: Their effect on corporate financial performance

Conventional wisdom holds that when a firm gets into trouble due to lagging sales and rising costs, cutting the size of the organization to reduce fat and waste is a normal and effective response. In this study, evidence was found to suggest that just the opposite might be true. The financial performance of Fortune 100 companies was tracked over a five-year period—two years prior to the announced layoff, the year of the layoff announcement, and two years following it. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that financial performance worsened, rather than improved, following announced layoffs. Strategic and human resource implications for the management of corporate downsizing are provided.     

Exploring optimization through hierarchies and ratio scales

This paper explores the concept of optimization by solely using the AHP and compares outcomes with those obtained in traditional optimization theory without and with constraints. The difference is essentially in the absence of the traditional black box involving complex manipulations in algebra or the calculus on an assumed linear or nonlinear mathematical structure. This paper is an exploratory attempt to use an individual's understanding together with a way to convert his judgments to ratios to deal with optimization. At first sight it may go contrary to the reader's (learned) intuition, but in the end he must face the question of whether the magic of traditional manipulations gives rise to better answers than one's actual and complete understanding in which one does not abdicate judgmental control of the solution, and why. This idea is ripe for deeper and more detailed exploration.     

Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Keynes' theory of money and his attack on the classical model

This paper centers on Keynes' theory of money and his attack on the classical model. Keynes criticized the self-correcting model of the British orthodoxy along two separate lines. In the first, in which Keynes' theory of money was crucial, he took the institutional variables as given and examined the functional relationships. Keynes' burden was to undermine what he termed the "classical dichotomy," where money was a veil, playing no role in determining output and employment. Two key features of the orthodox model were loanable funds and quantity theories, and Keynes' theory of money emerged from the rejection of these theories. The key to his attack on the classical dichotomy was the speculative demand for money, which he presented as an indirect, unstable function of the interest rate. Hence, Keynes linked money demand to the interest rate. The interest rate was thus determined by monetary variables rather than real factors, contrary to British orthodox opinion. Keynes then demonstrated that intended investment and saving need not be equal at a full employment equilibrium.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. The authors are grateful to participants for their helpful suggestions. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.