Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Gentlemanly capitalism in New Zealand

This article responds to McAloon's contribution to this journal criticising the argument advanced by P.J. Cain and myself in British Imperialism . McAloon's research on Canterbury and Otago merits serious attention, but it is argued here that he is mistaken in claiming that it disproves the case we made for applying our concept of gentlemanly capitalism to New Zealand. Both the structure of 'settler capitalism' and the social characteristics of the settlers themselves provide a good fit with our interpretation. Nevertheless, McAloon deserves credit for putting this subject on the agenda, and it is to be hoped that other historians of New Zealand (and also of Australia) will now reconsider the relationship between the 'rules of the game' established by the imperial centre and the degrees of dependence experienced by the constituent parts of the empire.     

The Influence of Economists On the Federal Reserve Act

Many economists helped to lay the groundwork for the Federal Reserve. Some did important work analyzing the problems of the National Bank System and arguing for formation of a central bank in economics journals. At least as importantly, if not more so, some economists took an active role in the reform movement and provided help and advice with the actual Congressional bill. Among these are J. Lawrence Laughlin, who chaired a group that actively raised support for the Federal Reserve Act in Congressional districts, and H. Parker Willis, who served as an expert for the subcommittee which wrote the original draft of what became the Federal Reserve Act. More broadly, this episode illustrates the impact that intellectuals and ideas can have on actual events; the analysis contemporary economists did in academic journals and in more political activities before and after the panic of 1907 guided the actual formation of a working central bank (JEL B10, N21).     

A comparison of several approximations to the power function of the likelihood ratio test in covariance structure analysis*

In this paper we compare alternative asymptotic approximations to the power of the likelihood ratio test used in covariance structure analysis for testing the fit of a model. Alternative expressions for the noncentrality parameter (ncp) lead to different approximations to the power function. It appears that for alternative covariance matrices close to the null hypothesis, the alternative ncp's lead to similar values, while for alternative covariance matrices far from H_o the different expressions for the ncp can conflict substantively. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the ncp proposed in Satorra and Saris (1985) gives the most accurate power approximations.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

Do Small Banks have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks

Consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concern about the survival of small banks, particularly as it relates to the availability of credit to small businesses. However, if small banks have an advantage in processing credit information, compared to large banks, they should continue to survive in a competitive environment. We evaluate risk-adjusted commercial loan yields (gross yields less net charge-offs and the risk-free rate of return) at small and large banks for the period of 1996 through 2001. Our primary finding is that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks earn greater risk-adjusted yields than larger banks. This result suggests that small banks make better choices from the available small business loans and is consistent with the notion that these banks have an information advantage in evaluating credit.