Financial Statements Insurance

The fact that auditors are paid by the companies they audit creates an inherent conflict of interest. We analyze how the provision of financial statements insurance could eliminate this conflict of interest and properly align the incentives of auditors with those of shareholders. We first show that when the benefits to obtaining funding are sufficiently large, the existing legal and regulatory regime governing financial reporting (and auditing) results in low quality financial statements. Consequently, the financial statements of firms are misleading and firms that yield a low rate‐of‐return (low fundamental value) are over‐funded relative to firms characterized by a high rate‐of‐return (high fundamental value). We present a mechanism whereby companies would purchase financial statements insurance that provides coverage to investors against losses suffered as a result of misrepresentation in financial reports. The insurance premia that companies pay for the coverage would be publicized. The insurers appoint and pay the auditors who attest to the accuracy of the financial statements of the prospective insurance clients. For a given level of coverage firms announcing lower premia would distinguish themselves in the eyes of the investors as companies with higher quality financial statements relative to those with higher premia. Every company would be eager to pay lower premia (for a given level of coverage) resulting in a flight to high audit quality. As a result, when financial statements insurance is available and the insurer hires the auditor, capital is provided to the most efficient firms.     

Kaldorian Disaggregation,Temporary Migration and Domestic Welfare

We build a model with two agents: domestic residents and temporary immigrants. The model incorporates Kaldorian disaggregation, with the two groups consuming different goods produced in the economy. It is established that, under certain conditions, an increase in immigrant labor lowers the welfare of the domestic residents. This runs against conventional wisdom that temporary immigration enhances the welfare of domestic residents.     

The Intergenerational Effects of Recessions

Several studies analyze the contemporaneous effects of recessions on individuals and their children. This paper shows that recessions also affect future offspring, not born yet. By linking fathers and offspring from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that a percentage-point increase in the national unemployment rate experienced by men between ages 16 and 20 reduces their future offspring's annual wages by 4 percent, occupational prestige by 3 percent, and education by 0.2 years. We then investigate the mechanisms explaining our findings.     

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial,shareholder and creditor incentives

We evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non-pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk-taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk-taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.