全文获取类型
收费全文 | 164篇 |
免费 | 6篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 40篇 |
工业经济 | 8篇 |
计划管理 | 24篇 |
经济学 | 64篇 |
综合类 | 2篇 |
旅游经济 | 1篇 |
贸易经济 | 20篇 |
农业经济 | 2篇 |
经济概况 | 9篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 2篇 |
2022年 | 3篇 |
2021年 | 3篇 |
2020年 | 8篇 |
2019年 | 2篇 |
2018年 | 3篇 |
2017年 | 4篇 |
2016年 | 6篇 |
2015年 | 2篇 |
2014年 | 3篇 |
2013年 | 18篇 |
2012年 | 8篇 |
2011年 | 6篇 |
2010年 | 10篇 |
2009年 | 11篇 |
2008年 | 3篇 |
2007年 | 6篇 |
2006年 | 5篇 |
2005年 | 6篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 8篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 7篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1998年 | 6篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 4篇 |
1995年 | 4篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 2篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1977年 | 1篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有170条查询结果,搜索用时 46 毫秒
41.
This paper studies the acquisition and subsequent utilization of production capacity in a multidivisional firm. In a setting
where an upstream division provides capacity services for itself and a downstream division, our analysis explores whether
the divisions should be structured as investment or profit centers. The choice of responsibility centers is naturally linked
to the internal pricing rules for capacity services. As a benchmark, we establish the efficiency of an arrangement in which
the upstream division is organized as an investment center, and capacity services to the downstream division are priced at
full historical cost. Such responsibility center arrangements may, however, be vulnerable to dynamic hold-up problems whenever
the divisional capacity assignments are fungible in the short-run, and therefore, it is essential to let divisional managers
negotiate over their actual capacity assignments. The dynamic hold-up problem can be alleviated with more symmetric choice
of responsibility centers. The firm can centralize ownership of capacity assets with the provision that both divisions rent
capacity on a periodic basis from a central unit. An alternative and more decentralized solution is obtained by a system of
bilateral capacity ownership in which both divisions become investment centers. 相似文献
42.
The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. 相似文献
43.
Global warming is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. One of the
key challenges in mounting a global response to it is the seeming unwillingness of the fastest growing economies such as China
and India to sign a treaty that limits their emissions. The aim of this paper is to examine the differential incentives of
countries on different trajectories of capital growth. A benchmark dynamic game to study global warming, introduced in Dutta
and Radner (J Econ Behav Organ, 2009), is generalized to allow for exogenous capital accumulation. It is shown that the presence of capital exacerbates the “tragedy
of the common”. Furthermore, even with high discount factors, the threat of reverting to the inefficient “tragedy” equilibrium
is not sufficient to deter the emissions growth of the fastest growing economies—in contrast to standard folk theorem like
results. However, foreign aid can help. If the slower growth economies—like the United States and Western Europe—are willing
to make transfers to China and India, then the latter can be incentivized to cut emissions. Such an outcome is Pareto improving
for both slower and faster growth economies. 相似文献
44.
45.
46.
We explore a dynamic commons problem and assess the welfare consequences of access to capital markets. The commons has a high
intrinsic rate of return but its fruits cannot be secured by individual agents. Capital market access allows resources to
be held securely and intertemporally transferred, but at a lower rate of return. In a two period model, we completely characterise
symmetric consumption and extraction behaviour in four environments: under a strategic and a competitive equilibrium concept,
and with and without market access. Strategic equilibria dominate competitive ones: while agents disagree over how to divide
the resource, all would prefer it to be larger; the strategic concept allows them to anticipate returns to their conservation.
As the number of agents becomes infinite, the strategic outcome converges to the competitive; as the number of agents falls
to one, it converges to the planner’s. Market access has a positive effect on welfare owing to its consumption and extraction
smoothing properties and a negative effect owing to its creation of an outside option to the commons, encouraging its depletion.
A sufficient condition for autarky to dominate market access for some levels of communal endowment is that the world market
discount factor exceed the subjective discount factor. Multiple equilibria may arise: these result from market access, not
the equilibrium concept.
The authors thank Ralph Bailey, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Matthew Cole, Carl Devore, Felix Kubler, Chirantan Ganguly, Martin
Jensen, Indrajit Ray, Celine Rochon, Dave Rusin, participants at the Royal Economic Society 2005 and an anonymous referee
for valuable comments. They are grateful for funding under the ESRC’s World Economy and Finance programme (RES-156-25-0022). 相似文献
47.
Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica45 (1977), 665-681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60. 相似文献
48.
Global warming (GW) is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. After providing some introductory background material, we introduce a benchmark dynamic game within which to study the GW problem. The model allows for population growth and is subsequently generalized to allow for changes in technology. In each case, a benchmark “Business as Usual” (BAU) equilibrium is analyzed and contrasted with the efficient solution. Furthermore, a complete characterization is provided in the benchmark model of the entire subgame perfect equilibrium value correspondence.JEL Classification Q54, D99, O12This paper builds on the Woytinsky Lecture delivered by Roy Radner at the University of Michigan, March 11, 1998. We would like to thank Graciela Chichilnisky, Arnulf Grubler, Geoffrey Heal, Leonid Hurwicz, Jill Jaeger, Peter de Janosi, Paul Kleindorfer, Giuseppe Lopomo, Thomas Schelling, Tapan Mitra, and Michael Toman for helpful discussions and references, and Andrew King, Charlotte V. Kuh, and Frank Sinden for comments on an earlier draft. In the case of the present enterprise, much of whose scope lies outside of our previous expertise, it is even more important than usual to emphasize that we are responsible for all errors. 相似文献
49.
The tragedy of the commons? 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
Summary We provide a complete characterization of the set of Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of dynamic common-property resource games a la Levhari and Mirman (1980). We find that all MPE of such games exhibit remarkably regular dynamic behavior. Surprisingly, however, and despite their memoryless nature, MPE need not result in a tragedy of the commons, i.e., overexploitation of the resource relative to the first-best solutions. We show through an example that MPE could, in fact, lead to the reverse phenomenon of underexploitation of the resource. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that, in pay off space, MPE are always suboptimal.The first version of this paper was written when Sundaram was a graduate student at Cornell University; the current version was completed when he was visiting the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to many people for their advice, and would like to thank, in particular, Mukul Majumdar, Andreu Mas-Colell, Tapan Mitra, Debraj Ray, Aldo Rustichini, and Karl Shell. We also benefitted from the comments of participants at presentations in Columbia University (Fall 1988) and Caltech (Spring 1990), and at various conferences. Partial support for this project was provided by the NSF under Grant 86-06944 (principal investigator: Karl Shell). 相似文献
50.
This paper attempts to operationalize and measure firm‐specific capabilities using an extant conceptualization in the resource‐based view (RBV) literature. Capabilities are conceived as the efficiency with which a firm employs a given set of resources (inputs) at its disposal to achieve certain objectives (outputs). We expand on extant theoretical literature on relative capabilities, by delineating the conditions that have to be met for relative capabilities to be measured non‐tautologically. We then proceed to suggest an estimation methodology, stochastic frontier estimation (SFE), that allows us to infer firm capabilities. We illustrate this technique with a sample of firms in the semiconductor industry. Our findings underscore the heterogeneity in R& D capability across firms in this industry, as well as the persistence in these capabilities over time. We also find that the market rewards high R& D capability firms, in that they show the highest average values of Tobin's q. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献