Measuring abnormal daily trading volume for samples of NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities using parametric and nonparametric test statistics

We extend prior research on the empirical properties of daily trading volume and methods to detect abnormal trading volume in two ways. We compare the performance of a nonparametric test statistic with the parametric test statistic used in prior research and we study samples of NASDAQ securities as well as samples of NYSE/ASE securities. Prior research has focused exclusively on NYSE securities. We find the nonparametric test statistic is more powerful in detecting abnormal trading volume than the parametric test statistic in both samples of NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities. We also document that abnormal trading volume will be detected more often in samples of NYSE/ASE securities compared to NASDAQ securities.     

Time diversification and security preferences: A stochastic dominance analysis

We use stochastic dominance to test whether investor should prefer riskier securities as the investment horizon lengthens. Return distributions for stocks, bonds, and U.S. Treasury bills are generated for holding periods of one to 25 years by simulation. For each holding period, stochastic dominance tests are run to establish preferences between the alternative security classes. Contrary to previous mean-variance based studies, we find no evidence that high-risk securities (stocks) dominate low-risk securities (bonds, Treasury bills) as the investment horizon lengthens. However, we do find that corporate bonds systematically dominate government bonds.     

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

The American corporate financing system, unlike that of most other countries, has not been organized around a set of “universal banks” that perform a variety of functions for their clients. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of American financial history is the number and variety of financial intermediaries, and their relationships with corporations (and one another). Besides commercial banks, there are investment banks, insurance companies, venture capitalists, commercial paper dealers, mutual funds, and many others. The economic role of such intermediaries is to reduce market frictions such as “asymmetric information” and “agency problems” that otherwise raise the cost of outside capital for U.S. companies. This article views the changing menu of such intermediaries and their networks as the driving force behind the evolution of American corporate finance. U.S. financial history is seen as a series of institutional and financial innovations designed in large part to work around costly restrictions on relationships–particularly, limits on the scale and scope of U.S. banks–that do not exist in most other countries. In terms of its success in reducing the information and control costs of corporate finance, the history of the American financial system includes periods of significant progress as well as major reversals. Three relatively successful periods– the early 19th-century in New England, the “incipient” universal banking of the 1920s, and modernday financial capitalism–are separated by periods of drastic reductions in the menu of financial relationships– particularly the Great Depression and its 20-year aftermath. Besides new financial claims like preferred stock and new intermediaries such as venture capitalists, another important innovation is new forms of cooperation among intermediaries– especially among banks, venture capitalists, trusts, pensions, and investment banks–that have enabled the U.S. financial system to provide some of the key advantages of universal banking systems. Some of the largest U.S. commercial banks today can be viewed as positioning themselves to play a central coordinating role in these new coalitions of intermediaries. In so doing, they may become the platform for a distinctively American universal banking system.     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Learning and the central bank

It is well known that sunspot equilibria may arise under an interest rate operating procedure in which the central bank varies the nominal rate with movements in future inflation (a forward-looking Taylor rule). This paper demonstrates that these sunspot equilibria may be learnable in the sense of E-stability.     

Incorporating Prior Information into A GMM Objective For Mixed Logit Demand Systems

Random parameters demand system estimates can generate upward sloping demands and imply margins outside of the theoretical bounds for profit maximization. If such violations are numerous enough, they can confound merger simulation exercises. Using Lerner indices for multiproduct firms playing static Bertrand games, we find that up to 35 per cent of implied margins for beer are outside the bounds. We characterize downward sloping demand and the theoretical bounds for profit maximization as prior information and extend the GMM objective function, incorporating inequality moments for product‐level own‐elasticities and brand level or product level Lerner indices. Very few violations remain when an inequality constrained estimator is used.     

Measuring rural consumers’ willingness to pay for quality labels using experimental auctions: the case of aflatoxin‐free maize in Kenya

Aflatoxins are a common health hazard in tropical countries, especially in rural areas. New methods to reduce aflatoxin levels in food staples, as well as cheaper test methods, are being developed, but consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for these improvements is unknown. A survey was conducted with a representative sample of rural consumers (1,344 in total, 63% women) in all major maize‐production zones of Kenya. The survey included an experimental auction with maize products of different qualities. The results showed that many rural consumers were aware of aflatoxins, but few understood their health risks. Respondents were willing to pay a premium for maize tested for aflatoxins and labeled, but asked a high discount for maize that was visibly contaminated with moldy grain. The premium was higher for respondents with education and in regions with aflatoxicosis outbreaks. Knowledge of aflatoxins substantially reduced the overall WTP, but did not increase the WTP for tested maize. Welfare analysis indicates that mandatory testing would result in substantial benefits if the cost of testing can be lowered to below the premium.     

Stock exchange mergers and market efficiency

The aim of this article is to examine the impact of stock exchange mergers on the degree of informational efficiency. For this purpose, we apply the generalized spectral shape test for the martingale difference hypothesis to the stock returns before and after the 31 domestic and cross-border mergers completed from 1997 to 2011. The test is conducted with moving subsample windows, allowing us to detect the periods of (in)efficiency, and thus to conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger and post-merger periods. We find that higher levels of efficiency are less frequent than lower levels of efficiency after a stock exchange merger. We also find that the impact on the level of efficiency depends on a range of merger characteristics such as the level of development, size, geographical diversification and industrial diversification of stock exchange.