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We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors. 相似文献
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This paper examines whether corruption acts to “grease” or “sand” firms' exit. Corruption could facilitate exit when it is a tax that distorts markets, or it might retard exit when it empowers firms to obtain undue favors. Results, using panel data across US states and considering market exit and firms' death rates as dependent variables, show that greater corruption acts as grease rather than sand in that it facilitates firms' exit/death. In other findings, larger states, greater regulations, and more unemployment contributed to exit, as did some demographic aspects. Higher state minimum wages resulted in firms' death but not exit. 相似文献
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Goel Pooja Garg Aashish Walia Nidhi Kaur Rajwinder Jain Mehak Singh Simarjeet 《Quality and Quantity》2022,56(5):3085-3110
Quality & Quantity - The present study examines the existing knowledge and intellectual structure on contagious diseases and tourism to map the development of the concept through collaborative... 相似文献
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We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an
inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations.
The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an
a priori evaluation of any given feasible resource allocation. The fairness ratio for an allocation provides a bound on the
discrepancy between this allocation and any other feasible allocation with respect to a large class of social welfare functions.
We provide a simple representation of the fairness ratio as well as a general method that can be used to directly determine
optimal fair allocations. For general convex environments, we provide a fundamental lower bound for the optimal fairness ratio
and show that as the population size increases, the optimal fairness ratio decreases at most logarithmically in what we call
the “inhomogeneity” of the problem. Our method yields a unique and “balanced” fair optimum for an important class of problems
with linear budget constraints. 相似文献
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Prem K. Goel 《Scandinavian actuarial journal》2013,2013(4):211-220
Abstract A sequence of maximum likelihood estimators based on a sequence of independent but not necessarily identically distributed random variables is shown to be consistent under certain assumptions. Some examples are given to show that these assumptions are easy to verify and not very restrictive. 相似文献
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This paper examines the international mixed duopoly behaviour with research spillovers. Using a two‐stage game with Research and Development (R&D) and output, we investigate the effects of imperfectly appropriable R&D on optimal R&D strategies of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm across different market interactions: (i) international R&D competition, (ii) only the foreign firm conducts R&D, (iii) only the domestic public firm conducts R&D, (iv) no firm conducts R&D, and (v) research joint venture. The results show that firms' research performances are determined by the degree of spillovers and the optimal R&D strategies involve R&D competition. Spillovers are shown to be socially beneficial and their absence can prove to be a strategic deterrent, with the public firm monopolising the market. Some of these findings contrast with the traditional models of oligopoly (with or without R&D) and mixed oligopoly (without R&D). 相似文献
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Rajeev K. Goel 《Applied economics》2013,45(20):2593-2599
Using recent state-level data from the United States, this article examines new influences on cigarette demand. In particular, we uniquely focus on the effects of unemployment and health insurance coverage on smoking. Results show that higher cigarette prices, a lack of health insurance and restrictions on smoking at home, all lead to reduced smoking. On the other hand, literacy, income, unemployment, workplace smoking restrictions, smokeless tobacco taxes and tobacco-producing states do not seem to have an appreciable impact. The magnitude of the price elasticity of demand is greater than that found in the pre-MSA era. Policy implications are discussed. 相似文献
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Rajeev K. Goel 《Applied economics》2013,45(24):3462-3468
A vast amount of research has considered numerous causes and correlates of corruption. Also, there have been many studies of the consequences of various forms of uncertainty. However, exploration of the nexus between economic uncertainty and corruption appears scarce. After providing an intuitive and heuristic linkage between general economic uncertainty and corruption, this article uses a large cross-country data set to augment a fairly standard model with simple proxies for uncertainty and to investigate how economic uncertainty might affect the prevalence of corruption. In addition, a quantile-regression framework is used to judge how the strength of various covariates may differ with the level of corruption. Seven main points emerge from the estimates. First, economic uncertainty is associated positively with corruption, and the relation seems to be robust across measures of uncertainty and corruption. Second, quantile-regression estimates indicate considerable parametric heterogeneity across the distribution of corruption. Third, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has the expected corruption-mitigating role. Fourth, increased political rights and civil liberties also appear to lower corruption. Fifth, greater government consumption is associated with lower corruption. Sixth, while the hyperinflation dummy lacks significance in most OLS regressions, its significance varies across the distribution of corruption. Seventh, neither police force nor government subsidies shows significance, but transition economies have more corruption. 相似文献