Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks

The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed? Building on the incomplete contracting approach, we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can have important effects on investment incentives, which has been neglected in the literature so far. We also study how the tasks of investing in quality improvements and cost reductions should be assigned. We show how the optimal contracts and governance structures depend on the exogenous parameters of the model such as the nature of the investments and the parties' bargaining powers.     

Hedging under model misspecification: All risk factors are equal,but some are more equal than others …

It is often difficult to distinguish among different option pricing models that consider stochastic volatility and/or jumps based on a cross‐section of European option prices. This can result in model misspecification. We analyze the hedging error induced by model misspecification and show that it can be economically significant in the cases of a delta hedge, a minimum‐variance hedge, and a delta‐vega hedge. Furthermore, we explain the surprisingly good performance of a simple ad‐hoc Black‐Scholes hedge. We compare realized hedging errors (an incorrect hedge model is applied) and anticipated hedging errors (the hedge model is the true one) and find that there are substantial differences between the two distributions, particularly depending on whether stochastic volatility is included in the hedge model. Therefore, hedging errors can be useful for identifying model misspecification. Furthermore, model risk has severe implications for risk measurement and can lead to a significant misestimation, specifically underestimation, of the risk to which a hedged position is exposed. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark     

A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism

We study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power, their military effectiveness, the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage. Only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist, while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil. We characterize analytically the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and show how the equilibrium strategies depend on the key model parameters. We provide an algorithm to find the endogenous set of cooperating countries based on their benefit from cooperation and their political/economic power.     

The effect of weather on consumer spending

There has been a great deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest that weather affects consumer decision making. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence to explain how the weather affects consumer spending and we detail the psychological mechanism that underlies this phenomenon. Specifically, we propose that the effect of weather – and, in particular, sunlight – on consumer spending is mediated by negative affect. That is, as exposure to sunlight increases, negative affect decreases and consumer spending tends to increase. We find strong support for this prediction across a series of three mixed methods studies in both the lab and the field.     

Corporate ownership and managerial short-termism: Results from a Finnish study of management perceptions

Increased media exposure to layoffs and corporate quarterly financial reporting have created arguable a common perception—especially favored by the media itself—that the companies have been forced to improve their financial performance from quarter to quarter. Academically, the relevant question is whether companies themselves feel that they are exposed to short-term pressure to perform even if it means that they have to compromise company's long-term future. This paper studies this issue using results from a survey conducted among the 500 largest companies in Finland. The results indicate that companies in general feel moderate short-term pressure, with reasonable dispersion across firms. There seems to be a link between the degree of pressure felt, and the firm's ownership structure, i.e. we find some support for the existence of potentially short-term versus long-term owners. We also find significant ownership related differences, in line with expectations, in how such short-term pressure is reflected in actual decision variables such as the investment criteria used.     

Models of disequilibrium and shortage in centrally planned economies Christopher Davis and Wojciech Charemza,editors Chapman and Hall,London and New York, 1989, 501 pp.

Portes applied the econometric disequilibrium model of market economies to Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) to show that the consumer goods sector was in equilibrium. Kornai considered these models inapplicable to CPEs and regarded CPEs as chronic shortage economies. Arguments on both sides of the debate are presented in this book. The conflict between Portes and Kornai lies in their microeconomic view of CPEs. While Portes acknowledges the welfare loss from shortages, Kornai analyzes and emphasizes it. Portes' view implies that changes in relative prices can reestablish equilibrium in CPEs. Kornai disagrees because CPEs do not respond to price changes like market economies. Only total reform, now attempted in many transition economies, can eliminate the imbalances.     

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