Investigating industry context effects in consumer-firm relationships: Preliminary results from a dispositional approach

Few, if any, past studies have attempted to develop a model to capture and explain industry context variability and hypothesize its effects on consumer-firm relationships. Generally, industry effects are ignored, described, or explained post hoc. Using the notion of consumers' dispositions toward a market, a framework is proposed for understanding the influence of industry context on consumer satisfaction, trust, value, and loyalty in relational exchanges. The empirical results of a survey in two service industries show that industry contexts matter and yield significant direct and moderating effects on consumer-firm relationships. The study underscores the promise of a dispositional approach for providing insights for the theory and practice of relationship marketing, resolvin goutstanding questions, and proposing fruitful areas for further examination. Edwin Nijssen, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the Nijmegen School of Management at the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His research interest focuses on strategic and international marketing issues, relationship marketing, brand management, and new-product development. He has published inLong Range Planning, theJournal of Product Innovation Management, Technology Forecasting and Social Change, R&D Management, Industrial Marketing Management, and theJournal of International Marketing and has written several books on marketing strategy. Jagdip Singh, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. His primary areas of research include consumer dissatisfaction and trust, measurement issues—including relationships between theoretical concepts and empirical observations— and the effectiveness of boundary role personnel. He has published in theJournal of Marketing, theAcademy of Management Journal, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Behavioral Research in Accounting, andManagement Science, among others. Deepak Sirdeshmukh, Ph.D., is a visiting assistant professor of marketing at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. His primary areas of research include consumer trust and consumer processing of brand information. He has published in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Consumer Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, and theJournal of Consumer Psychology, among others. Hartmut H. Holzmüeller, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the School of Business at Dortmund University, Germany. His research interests include cross-national consumer research and customer relationship marketing. Most of his work has been published in German. His articles also appeared in theJournal of International Marketing, Management International Review, andInternational Business Review.     

Old flames never die – the role of binding social ties for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms

This paper investigates the role of social ties and family embeddedness for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms. Family firms are mostly characterized by close and often inseparable ties between the dominant family coalition and the firm and offer specific resources within a context of both rational as well as non-rational factors that influence entrepreneurial strategies. We empirically test (n =?181) the relationship between binding social ties and innovation, strategic renewal, and corporate venturing. Our findings indicate a strong significance for networks and close and stable relationships both to inside the firm and the outside in decision making for corporate venturing and innovation. In contrast, the results for strategic renewal show no relevance of strong social ties. We link up with the debate on the role of owners as an important stakeholder group.

     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001     

Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000     

How to control a chaotic economy?

An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04.