Safety behavior and consumer responses to cigarette lighter safety mechanisms

This paper analyzes consumer responses to lighter child-resistant mechanisms using an original sample of 200 households with young children. Results from an in-house placement of lighters indicate that the child-resistant mechanism would diminish consumer care. The child-resistant device reduced risk perceptions, parental concern with lighter safety, the assessed need for precautions, and consumer care. The results provide the most detailed empirical evidence of the mechanisms driving the diminished safety precautions in response to technological improvements in safety. The overall efficacy of the mechanism, however, is sufficient to generate a safety improvement despite the diminished care.     

Organizational Sensemaking of Non-ethical Consumer Behavior: Case Study of a French Mutual Insurance Company

Researchers and managers alike are becoming increasingly interested in the topic of unethical consumer behavior. Where most studies view unethical behavior as something that is identifiable per se, the authors of the present article believe that it only exists because it has been constructed by people operating within a specific context. Hence the efforts made by this paper to explore, at the level of one specific organization, how interactions between employees and consumers might lead to the construct of unethical consumers. Based on a case study of France’s AMDM—a mutual insurance company set up to serve a client base comprising motorcyclists—the paper addresses how one group of consumers ends up being categorized as unethical by revealing the existence of a sensemaking process within the target organization. This process develops in three main phases: the nurturing of a shared ethos; the protection of employees’ recognized status; and the demonization of any group of consumers threatening this status. Managers incorporating this sensemaking process can avoid or mitigate the negative effects befalling organizations when these kinds of unethical consumer behavior are constructed.     

Corporate political transparency and the cost of debt

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine whether the predictive power of initial yield spreads of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) vary with the financial cycle. Using a...     

Dominant firms, “deep pockets,” and local market competition in banking

It has been argued that “deep pockets” and the diversified structure of large firms enable them to engage in predatory pricing in order to force their pricing policy on smaller firms in a market. Although there is some case history evidence that large firms may actively intimidate smaller rivals, there is no evidence of a more generalized nature. Therefore, this study undertakes a cross section investigation of the effects of large, dominant firms on competition in local markets. The basic hypothesis is that the presence of large firms in a market will be reflected in relatively limited rivalry and poor profit and price performance. The analysis focuses on 259 local markets in commercial banking in each of the years 1966, 1970, and 1976. Regression results provide tentative support for the hypothesis. Prices tend to be relatively high and rivalry is weak in markets where dominant firms are relatively important.     

Designing an immunized portfolio: Is M-squared the key?

The theoretical and empirical properties of M-squared, a measure of cash flow dispersion used in designing duration-hedged portfolios, are examined. Contrary to prior research, minimizing M-squared is not independent of the stochastic process and the minimum M-squared portfolio is a ‘bullet’ only under a specific, convexity condition derived in the paper.Using a data base of default-free, Government of Canada bonds to set up minimum M-squared, duration-matching portfolios, we find that the convexity property does not hold in general and that minimum M-squared portfolios fail to hedge as effectively as portfolios including a bond maturing on the horizon date.     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic “political business cycles” in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of “political monetary cycles,” that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of “political budget cycles,” or “loose” fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.     

Examining the Leontief Paradox in U.S. Agricultural Trade

Factor intensity of United States agricultural trade is examined in the context of Leontief's classic paradox using Leontief's method as well as methods developed recently by Leamer and others. Findings indicate that factor endowments are important determinants of U.S. agriculture's comparative advantage in trade as suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.