Multistage bilateral bargaining model with incomplete information—A fuzzy approach

The study proposes the implementation of an intermediation model in supply chains, integrating game theory and fuzzy logic, to represent the characteristic aspects of a bilateral bargaining with incomplete information where supplier–customer relationships are indirectly managed by a third party agent.The choice of combining these theories comes out from the necessity of smoothing the peculiar elements of the two analysis tools that, in describing real situations, present many potentialities of reciprocal adaptation. The scope is to combine a formal structure that could figure out the interrelations among actors involved in a strategic decisional context, with a mathematical elaboration of natural imprecision, uncertainty and incompleteness of data and information.The model derives from the theoretic foundation of Spulber [1999. Market Microstructure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK] and Rubinstein [1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–109] that, compared to the classical framework of asymmetric information and bid-spread problem by Harsanyi [1967. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. I. The basic model. Management Science 14, 159–182], describe the process through the definition of new parameters such as bargaining power and breakdown probability. The contribution to the research is enriched by fuzzyfication process of data, considering Qi et al. [2005. Design retrieval technology of fuzzy customer requirements. In: World Congress on Mass Customization and Personalization] experiences, to build a framework that could transform inputs from the transaction, agents and market in an output that could regulate the possible concessions and the opportunity of accepting or refusing an offer.     

The complementary nature of technological capabilities: Measurement and robustness issues

The application of composite indicators to complex phenomena in social science has come to remarkable prominence. As a result, they have been widely applied in wide-ranging fields. This paper explores the application of a composite indicator of technological capabilities that can be also valid for composite indicators in other fields. We focus on whether different methodologies to build composite indicators lead to different results. The arithmetic mean to aggregate technological capabilities variables has been widely criticized, as it allows for perfect substitutability between variables, thus disregarding the complementary nature of technological capabilities. We introduce a new aggregation rule, the concave mean, in order to take into account the complementarity argument in a Science-Technology-Innovation context. Using a dataset for 138 countries, we show that the arithmetic mean is biased in principle but robust in practice. This depends upon the fact that technologically more advanced countries tend to have a more complementary structure in their technological capabilities compared to less developed nations.     

对重大环境污染事故罪的探讨

20世纪70年代以来，我国环保工作由于政府的重视而逐渐进入了法制的轨道，大量关于环境保护的法律法规相继出台；但目前仍存在大量的环境污染和环境破坏问题，这给社会经济发展和人民生命财产造成了严重危害。为了适应惩治环境犯罪的需要．重大环境污染事故罪作为新增罪名被写入97刑法中。目前法学界对该罪仍存争议，从犯罪构成要件入手对本罪主、客观要件作一些探讨具有现实意义。     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

IS CORPORATISM FEASIBLE?

This paper investigates the effects of cooperation (corporatism) on macroeconomic performance by considering a rather standard policy game between the government and a monopoly union. We stress the shortcomings of the traditional way used to model cooperation in policy games (the maximization of the weighted sum of players’ preferences), which only approximates the Nash product solution. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, as it often reduces the union's utility. In particular, we show that an inflation‐neutral union will never find it profitable to cooperate with the government, unless side‐payments are considered. The study of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.     

Business Ethics: Law As A Determinant of Business Conduct

The Principles of Corporate Governance require that business conduct conform to the law. In recent years, news reports of business misconduct have cast doubt on a conclusion that conformity is the prevalent practice. This article explores the influence of law on business conduct by comparing the law’s requirements and purposes with actual business conduct in the market. Specifically, it explores whether certain legal regimes are more effective than others in inducing greater commitment to legal compliance by corporate actors. The conclusion drawn is that the prevalent legal regime – a vague common law or legislative mandate – is typically associated with corporate conduct that evades or ignores the law’s mandate or its underlying purpose. Vincent Di Lorenzo is Professor of Law; Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center for Church and Society, St. John's University; J.D. Columbia University (Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar); Associate Articles Editor, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems. Before joining the faculty at St. John's University School of Law, Professor Di Lorenzo was a member of the faculty at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and was associated with a major Wall Street firm practicing in the real estate-banking department. He is a member of the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association. Professor Di Lorenzo has authored many articles and books in the banking, legislation and real estate areas.     

Welfare Implications of a Preferential Tariff Reduction for Agricultural Exports from Less Developed Countries vs. a Generalized Tariff Reduction

The paper presents the results of a theoretical study focusing on a comparative evaluation of the welfare effects of a preferential tariff reduction for agricultural exports from less developed countries versus a generalized tariff reduction. The results are derived using a diagrammatic approach. The analysis is developed within a partial equilibrium framework with one commodity, three large countries (importing developed country, exporting developed country, developing country), fixed exchange rates and zero transportation costs. The theoretical model makes provisions for a country to switch from being an exporter to being an importer, or vice versa, as the equilibrium price changes. Three alternative policy scenarios are analyzed: the imposition of a non-discriminatory tariff, a preferential tariff reduction, and a generalized tariff reduction. Two alternative definitions of the welfare functions are used. One is based on consumers' and producers' surplus, the other adds domestic income and changes in foreign exchange earnings/expenditure. Some methodological implications of the specific model used are discussed, along with the impact, in terms of welfare, of the policy scenarios considered.